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| 題名: | 雙邊市場論文集：搜尋、配對與多重據點;Essays on Two-Sided Markets: Searching, Matching and Multi-Homing |
| 作者: | 黃晏奇;Huang,Yen-Chi |
| 貢獻者: | 經濟學研究所 |
| 關鍵詞: | 多重據點;雙邊市場;網路效果;平台定價;搜尋;配對;platform pricing;searching;two-sided market;multi-homing;matching;network effect |
| 日期: | 2012-07-24 |
| 上傳時間: | 2012-09-11 19:10:04 (UTC+8) |
| 出版者: | 國立中央大學 |
| 摘要: | 本論文集合了三篇關於雙邊市場之議題且可獨立閱讀的文章，雙邊市場是一種新興的模型架構，適用於此架構之產業有幾項共同特徵：一、存在一媒合平台介於市場雙邊；二、跨越市場雙邊的交叉網路外部效果。平台的存在使得市場雙邊的平台使用者得以互動，而平台可以針對每一邊的使用者收取費用，再者，使用者願意付較高的費用給對邊使用者人數較多的平台，換句話說，每一位使用者的進入會對市場另一邊的使用者之願付費用產生正向影響，因此我們稱此效果為跨市場雙邊的交叉網路外部效果。此外，使用者可能會為了享受更強的網路效果而選擇進入多家平台，文獻上將這樣的使用者稱為多重據點的使用者。相較於既存的文獻，本論文採用的模型能更深入的探討使用者於平台上的互動細節與其據點選擇行為，更進一步地研究使用者的行為與平台的定價策略間之關聯，本論文補充了文獻對研究以下問題之不足：第一，交叉的網路外部效果從何而來；第二，造成使用者更願意選擇多重據點的因素為何；第三，平台的定價策略如何與使用者的多重據點行為互相影響。本論文之內文首先介紹雙邊市場文獻關心的主要議題，然後將三篇文章編為第 2 章、第 3 章與第 4 章並提供其摘要如下。第 2 章針對買賣交易平台提供了一個理論模型，模型中加入平台的使用者人數以及網路效果皆為內生推得，除了交叉的、正向的網路外部效果之外，市場雙邊各自會有一個直接的、負向的網路外部效果。平台的最適定價策略除了受平台自身的成本與使用者的交易收益影響外，更受到使用者所帶來的邊際網路效果影響。由於賣家可以透過定價將平台的收費轉嫁給買家，平台不可能補貼賣家。第 3 章之中，模型考慮了兩個交易平台、賣家商品的異質性與平台的搜尋技術優勢，在這個模型中賣家可以自由的選擇多重據點且在不同的平台上定不同的價格。這個模型可以證明買家永遠能從搜尋技術較先進的平台上得到較多效用，但賣家是否可以因此得到好處則決定於商品的異質程度，若商品的異質程度夠大，那麼賣家可以從較先進的平台得到較多利潤，若相反，則賣家進入搜尋技術較先進的平台會面臨強大的競爭壓力，因此壓縮了利潤空間。此外，現實的資料呈現出多重據點的賣家隨時間經過先增加後減少的現象，此模型可以提供一個合理的解釋。第 4 章採用了一個內生考慮使用者多重據點行為以及平台定價策略之模型。模型的結果顯示當愈多使用者採用多重據點的策略時平台的價格競爭會愈激烈，另外，我們也可以透過此模型發現一個過去文獻忽略的效果：同質化效果，與外生假定只有單邊使用者有多重據點的模型相比，此模型考慮的雙邊市場多重據點均衡呈現出較弱地交叉網路效果，因此平台交叉補貼使用者的誘因減少；但同時，多重據點行為帶來的同質化效果使平台的競爭更激烈，所以多重據點行為對於平台的定價策略造成的效果是正負不定的。This dissertation is a collection of three independent yet related essays which study the topics on the two-sided market literature.The ``two-sided market' is a new modeling approach that fits certain industries very well.The common features of the two-side market industries are the presence of the intermediate platforms and the cross-side network effects.The platforms facilitate the interactions of the users on the two sides,and are able to charge a fee from each side of the market.The platform users on one side have a higher willingness to pay for entering the platform with larger participation on the other side.A new participant on one side therefore has an effect on the users from the other side.As a consequence, the effect is defined as the cross-side network effect which is usually positive.For enjoying more benefits of the network effect from the other side,the users might have the incentive to enter multiple platforms.Those who do enter multiple platform are defined as the users of multi-homing.Comparing with the existing literature, the models in this dissertation provide more detail discussions about the users' interactions and multi-homing behaviors.In particular, the interaction of the platform's pricing strategy and the users' behaviors.Current dissertation contributes to the two-sided market literature by answering several important questions:Where do the external effects come from,what are the reasons make the users more willing to multi-home, and how is the platform's pricing strategy interact with the cross-group network effects and the multi-homing behaviors.The first chapter in current dissertation introduces the main issues in the two-sided market literature.The three essays are organized as chapter 2, chapter 3 and chapter 4.I provide the abstract of chapter 2, chapter 3 and chapter 4 as follows.Chapter 2 provides a theoretical model for a specific type of two-sided platform: The buyer-seller transaction platform.In the model, the number of participants and the source of network effects are endogenously determined.The platform is shown to exhibit both positive cross-side and negative within-side network effects.The optimal pricing of the platform depends not only on the cost of providing service and the benefits of the participants,but also on how the marginal entrant (either a buyer or a seller) affects the matching probability.Since the sellers can shift the burden of entry fee to the buyers, the platform never subsidizes the sellers.In chapter 3, a model with two platforms, product heterogeneity and searching engine technology advantage is considered.In the model, the sellers are allowed to multi-home and charge differently on each platform.It has been proved that the buyers always benefit from advanced searching technology, however, whether the sellers benefit from the advanced technology is determined by the degree of product heterogeneity.If the degree of product heterogeneity is large enough,then the sellers benefit from the advanced technology,otherwise, the sellers will suffer from advanced technology,for high competition pressure and low profits.Furthermore, the model proves that the number of multi-homing sellers is at first increasing and then decreasing as the degree of new technology prevalence.In chapter 4, a two-sided market model in which the multi-homing decisions of all users and the platform prices are endogenously determined is considered.The results show that the platforms compete more aggressively when the users on one side switch from single-homing to multi-homing.Furthermore, a homogenized effect which is neglected in existing literature is discovered.Compared with the one-sided multi-homing case,the equilibrium in the two-sided multi-homing case corresponds to a less effective cross-group network effect which causes the platforms reluctance to cross subsidize users.Moreover, an increase of multi-homing choices made by users on one side makes the platforms more substitutable on the other side. |
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