供應鏈中探討伴隨著風險偏好與需求不確定下在氣候折扣合約下所達成的通路協調;Channel Coordination Under the Weather Rebate Contract with Risk Preference on Demand Uncertainty in Supply Chain

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题名:	供應鏈中探討伴隨著風險偏好與需求不確定下在氣候折扣合約下所達成的通路協調;Channel Coordination Under the Weather Rebate Contract with Risk Preference on Demand Uncertainty in Supply Chain
作者:	劉治言;Liu,Chih-Yen
贡献者:	工業管理研究所
关键词:	供應鏈風險;合約設計;報童問題;通路協調;Channel Coordination;Contract Design;Newsvendor Problem;The Risk of Supply Chain
日期:	2013-01-28
上传时间:	2013-03-25 15:47:35 (UTC+8)
出版者:	國立中央大學
摘要:	供應鏈的通路協調已在許多論文中被廣泛的討論，應用了許多供應鏈的機制達成通路協調，例如:數量折扣，減價銷售，大量生產…等，而許多不同的供應鏈機制也被拿來做比較，看是否皆能達成通路協調，有些部份的論文則是加入的風險偏好程度去做比較，其假設情境為風險中立的供應鏈成員。然而，風險態度除了中立態度之外，尚有偏好及趨避兩種風險態度，如果只以風險中立的態度是無法表現出供應鏈成員的行為。因此，在本研究中，我們在報童模型下討論當供應商面臨風險中立及風險趨避的零售商時，如何達成通路協調以及獲得最大的利潤。在本研究中，我們假設供應鏈中成員為一位供應商及一位零售商。另外，我們設定了兩個案例及另外兩種案件類型去探討，藉由當供應商面臨風險中立及風險趨避零售商時利潤的差異。一般而言，相較於風險中立的零售商，風險趨避的零售商在面對不確定需求量的情形下，訂購量則較少。然而，較少的訂購量將使得供應商的利潤相對減少。為解決此供應鏈的問題，本研究提出有關氣候折扣合約下供應鏈的通路協調機制，本研究的討論重點是由供應商提供一份有關氣候折扣合約給零售商，並藉由此機制設計氣候折扣給零售商，進而說服供應商接受此氣候折扣合約，使其願意合作已達成通路協調，同時達成通路協調下的最佳訂購量。Channel coordination of the supply chain has been widely discussed in many research. Application many of supply chain mechanism to achieve channel coordination, ex: quantity discount, markdown, mass-production… and so on, and many of different supply chain mechanism to comparison, whether it can be achieve channel coordination or not, some of the research add the risk preference to comparison, and it assumed the situation that is risk-neutral member of the supply chain. However, in addition to the risk preference of the risk-neutral, it seems that had the risk preference of the risk-prone and the risk-averse, the assumption of risk-neutral seems to be inadequate for the supply chain in reality. Hence, in our study, we discussed the newsvendor model, when the supplier faces the risk-neutral and the risk-averse retailer, how to achieve channel coordination and maximun the profit.In our study, we assume that supply chain with one supplier and one retailer. Besides, we set two scenarios and another two cases to discuss, the difference of profit when the supplier faces the risk-neutral and the risk-averse retailer. Generally speaking, the risk-averse retailer’s orders quantity is compared to less than the risk-neutral retailer’s orders quantity on demand uncertainty. However, the fewer order quantity, the less profit is for the supplier, types of contract to identify the profits of risk-neutral and risk-averse retailer. To solve the question of the supply chain, we proposed the channel coordination of the supply chain about weather rebate contract in our study, our study is focusing on the supplier provides the retailer about a weather rebate contract, and by the mechanism to design the weather rebate for the retailer, further to persuade the retailer to accept the weather rebate contract that let the retailer willing cooperation to achieve coordination, and then can achieve channel coordination of the optimal order quantity.
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