資料載入中.....
|
請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件:
http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/60899
|
| 題名: | 寡占廠商非價格上的競武：以國際主要廠商為例 |
| 作者: | 潘旻蕙;Pan,Min-hui |
| 貢獻者: | 產業經濟研究所 |
| 關鍵詞: | 寡占廠商;Baumol 理論;競爭;研發;資本;武器競賽;Oligopoly,;Baumol hypothesis;Competition;R&D;Capital;Arms race |
| 日期: | 2013-07-16 |
| 上傳時間: | 2013-08-22 12:06:05 (UTC+8) |
| 出版者: | 國立中央大學 |
| 摘要: | 在知識爆炸的年代，面對瞬息萬變的市場，科技的轉換更是日新月異，技術創新、製程創新儼然成為廠商最主要的競爭優勢。傳統經濟學中，寡占廠商為數甚少，彼此具有互相牽制的特性，廠商透過價格競爭，以獲取較高的利潤，除此之外，廠商更企圖以非價格的方式鞏固其市場地位，劃下一道讓競爭對手無法跨越的鴻溝。Baumol(2002)提出寡占廠商以持續推出的新產品來作競爭，背後所依靠的是廠商持續投入研發與創新，此競爭方式猶如進行一場武器競賽(arms-race)，競爭廠商彼此研發費用上，存在著「追漲不追跌」的現象。
本研究以面板市場的主要寡占廠商：Samsung、LG、奇美(CMO)、友達(AUO)，作為探討的對象，並利用實證的方法(一階差分模型、有限期落差分配模型、假設檢定) ，分別檢驗研發與資本投入量，以及研發與資本變動量上的變化，爾後，再進一步地綜合研發和資本的綜合投入量及其對應的變動量，以衡量上述四大面板廠商的研發與資本決策，是否符合Baumol所提出的競武理論？本研究的實證結果顯示國際間主要面板的生產廠商不論在研發上或是資本投入上，確實存有追漲不追跌的競武情形，意即廠商的確以產品創新與擴大產能作為寡占廠商間競爭的手段。再者，當期面板廠商間若在綜合其研發及其資本投入之和後，則實證結果更進一步證實韓國廠商Samsung、LG間的競賽，以及跨國廠商Samsung、奇美之間，綜合投入的追漲不追跌的效果，遠勝於上述本研究單獨對研發支出或資本支出上彼此間之競武所呈現之強度。而此顯示出，面對領導廠商Samsung的研發與資本投入上激烈的攻勢，追隨廠商LG、奇美將適時調配其研發與資本的投入比例，並採取兩者交叉兼配並行的方式，作為競賽的整體策略。
In the age of knowledge with a rapid technology transition on the market, how to maintaining the firm’s competitiveness in the area of product as well as process innovation has become a major concern. In the traditional economic theory of the oligopoly market, there are few firms in the market and each firm restrains his rivals in an attempt to compete with price and thereby increase overall profitability. Besides, firms can also enhance their market position through a non-price approach, i.e., by setting up huge entry barriers so that their potential rivals could never impose a real threat to them. Baumol (2002) indicates that firms can actually enhance their competitiveness by constantly introducing new products and new processes into their oligopoly product market and thus form a strong entry barrier to his rivalry firms. As such, the R&D expenditures and innovation activities have actually become powerful competition tools and have, in turn, created an arms race relationship among the oligopolistic firms since all the competing firms are likely to react in the same manner.
The study investigates four major oligopolistic firms in the Thin Film Transistor– Liquid Crystal Display (TFT-LCD) market, namely, Samsung, LG in Korea and Chi Mei Optoelectronics (CMO), and AU Optronics (AUO) in Taiwan. By utilizing firm-level data on R&D and capital investment, and by testing such firm level data through empirical models such as: first difference, finite distributed lag and binominal test models we can test the validity of Baumol’s arms race hypothesis. The key findings of this paper are as follows: First, TFT-LCD oligopolistic firms in the international market create an arms race not only in regard to R&D expenses while engaging in innovative activities, but also to capital investment while engaging in production efficiency. Second, these four firms actually create an even stronger arms race relationship on the sum of R&D and capital inputs. Our empirical evidence confirms that the above mentioned arms race phenomena will actually become even more intensified between leader (Samsung) and followers (LG, CMO). In addition, the followers (LG, CMO) may actually leveraging both their R&D and capital expenses instantaneously so as to be more responsive to leader’s (Samsung) possible competitive strategies. |
| 顯示於類別: | [產業經濟研究所] 博碩士論文
|
文件中的檔案:
| 檔案 |
描述 |
大小 | 格式 | 瀏覽次數 |
|---|
| index.html | | 0Kb | HTML | 848 | 檢視/開啟 |
|
在NCUIR中所有的資料項目都受到原著作權保護.
|
