經理人債型報酬積極管理之研究;The Active Management of Debt-Like Compensation

NCUIR > School of Management at National Central University > Department of Finance > Research Project > Item 987654321/62860

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/62860

Title:	經理人債型報酬積極管理之研究;The Active Management of Debt-Like Compensation
Authors:	沈信漢
Contributors:	國立中央大學財務金融學系
Keywords:	管理科學
Date:	2013-12-01
Issue Date:	2014-03-17 14:06:12 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	行政院國家科學委員會
Abstract:	研究期間：10208~10307;Pension benefits and deferred compensation combined represents a debt obligation owed by the company to the executive and constitutes the so-called “inside debt”, a debt-like component in the executive compensation package. The advocates of the rational use of inside debt suggest that the debt-like compensation aligns the manager’s incentive with debt holders’ and thus reduce the agency cost in debt. The opponents, however, argue that the use of inside debt captures the managerial power rather than optimal contract. In this study we examine whether firms actively manage the amount of inside debt and maintain it near the optimal level. Our evidence will shed light on the underlying motivation of the firms for granting executive compensation in a form of debt.
Relation:	財團法人國家實驗研究院科技政策研究與資訊中心
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Finance] Research Project

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