摘要: | 研究期間:10108~10207;It is still debatable about why bidders in sealed-bid first-price auctions (hereafter, FP auctions) overbid, i.e. bid more than the risk neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) derived by Vickrey (1961). Risk aversion suggested by Cox, Smith, and Walker (1982-1988) is the most common explanation for overbidding behavior in FP auctions. Recently, emotion-based explanations shed new light on this ‘somewhat’ irrational behavior. Among these, bidders avoid to feel regret (regret aversion) for their bidding behavior ex ante after receiving the information feedback about the results of the auction has been supported by recent experiments (Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay, 2007; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2008). However, the above studies ignore the potential impact of the number of bidders which may be the most important concern in deriving RNNE in FP auctions (Vickrey, 1961). Hence, the effect of the number of bidders interacts with different types of regret information in shaping the bidding behavior in FP auctions should be considered in the experimental designations. Thus, we will conduct several experiments specified by regret information types, with the consideration of the influences of the number of bidders, will be the major work of the first year’s project. Besides, in the second year, overbidding behavior in the three other auction mechanisms, which are sealed-bid second-price auctions, English auctions, and Dutch auctions, will be compared with FP auctions. All the comparisons will be conducted by experimental designations based on the above framework. |