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    請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/63607


    題名: 影響網路拍賣參與訂價因素之探討;The Determinates of Participative Pricing in Online Auction
    作者: 林美霞;Lin,Mei-Hsia
    貢獻者: 企業管理學系碩士在職專班
    關鍵詞: 參與訂價;延遲出價;網路拍賣;線上拍賣;資訊不對稱;贏家詛咒;asymmestric information;internet auction;late bidding;online auction;participative pricing;winner's curse
    日期: 2007-07-25
    上傳時間: 2014-05-08 15:13:10 (UTC+8)
    出版者: 國立中央大學
    摘要: 本研究探討線上參與訂價的價格決定因素。自2006年11月4日至12月26日止,從台灣Yahoo拍賣網站蒐集1013筆飯店住宿卷拍賣成交資料,以迴歸分析探討拍賣中影響結標價的決定因子(determinates)。由於住宿卷產品同質性高,同一飯店同一產品具有價格共通性(Common Value),結標價不同可能是因為競標策略或其他變數的影響,對這些變數的研究可以讓我們了解隱含在拍賣參與訂價的過程中的消費者行為。
    資料分兩群,分有直購價與無直購價,分別觀察在有直購價下與無直購價下個別自變數對結標價的影響。實證結論如下:
    (1) 商品數量與結標價為負向關係。
    (2) 起標價對結標價沒有顯著影響。
    (3) 出價次數是拍賣氛圍的表徵,對結標價具正向關係。
    (4) 直購價對結標價有正向影響。
    (5) 最小出價增額對結標價的影響權重最重,且為正向關聯。
    (6) 運費在無直購價情境中有正向影響,在有直購價的情境下,淡化到不具影響力。
    (7) 買家評價對結標價影響未達顯著水準。
    (8) 賣家評價於無直購價中的參考作用比在有直購價情境中高,無直購價中賣家評為正向顯著影響、賣家正評為負向顯著影響、賣價負評為負向顯著影響。在有直購價的拍賣中,唯有賣家正評為負向顯著影響。
    (9) 刊登天數對拍賣結標價影響未達顯著水準。
    (10) 第一位投標者出價對結標價有正向影響。
     (11) 結標時間為晚間時段在有直購價情境下高度正向影響,在無直購價下影響未達顯著水準。
    (12)延遲出價(late bidding)在有直購價情境下對結標價有負面高度影響,在無直購價下影響未達顯著水準。
    (13)1元起要對結標價有高度負向影響。
    ;This paper presents an exploratory analysis of the determinants of participative pricing in online auction for collectable Taiwan hotel coupon at Yahoo Web site. Starting from November 4 through December 26, we have obtained 1013 closing auction data, and perform multiple regression analysis on a restricted sample of the 1013 data.
    We choose auction transaction data on hotel coupon as our research data due to its homogeneous and obvious common value. It leaves us room to measure the variables influence on the auction final price.
    We separated the data into two groups, one is listing buyout price and another is without listing buyout price, observed the price determinants effect and magnitude on the auction final price. We have thirteen major finding.
    (1). Item quantity has a negative effect on the final auction price.
    (2). Minimum bids have no significant effect on the final auction price.
    (3). Number of bids have positive effects on the final auction price.
    (4). Buyout price has positive effect on the final auction price.
    (5). Minimum bid increment has positive effects on the final auction price.
    (6). Freight has a much greater effect on the final auction price when there is no listing buyout price than under listing buyout price.
    (7). Buy’s feedback ratings have no effect on the final auction price.
    (8). Seller’s feedback ratings have a much greater effect on the final price when there is no listing buyout price than under listing buyout price. Seller’s positive feedback ratings have a negative impact on the final auction price. Seller’s negative feedback ratings have a significant negative impact on the final auction price when there is no listing buyout price; have no effect under listing buyout price.
    (9) Auction listing day has no effect on the final auction price.
    (10). First bidder price has positive effect on the final auction price.
    (11). Listing auction at night time has significant positive effects on the final price under listing buyout price, have no effect when there is no listing buyout price.
    (12). Late bidding has significant negative impact on the auction final price under listing buyout price, has no effect when there is no listing buyout price.
    (13). One dollar minimum bid has significant negative impact on the auction final price.
    顯示於類別:[企業管理學系碩士在職專班] 博碩士論文

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