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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/64459

    Title: 投資人情緒對高階經理人誘因型薪酬制定之影響;Investor Sentiment and Executive Compensation
    Authors: 張簡乃綺;Chien,Nai-Chi Chang
    Contributors: 財務金融學系
    Keywords: 代理理論;投資人情緒;經理人薪酬;誘因型薪酬;Agency theory;Sentiment;Top manager compensation;Incentive compensation
    Date: 2014-06-19
    Issue Date: 2014-08-11 18:30:13 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 國立中央大學
    Abstract: 本文旨在分析投資人情緒對企業在制定高階經理人誘因型薪酬上所造成之影響,由代理理論出發,探討公司在制定誘因型薪酬契約的同時,是否會因應當下市場投資人情緒的起伏來調整政策,達到有效運用誘因型薪酬之目的,以維持其公司治理的效率性,本研究以台灣證券交易所上市上櫃公司高階經理人之薪酬契約為研究對象,並以世新大學投資人情緒指數作為主要解釋變數,控制變數則包含公司績效、規模、負債比率、研發費用率及公司成立年數,研究期間為2005年至2012年共八年。
    ;In this essay we investigate whether companies take into account market sentiment when designing compensation contracts for their top managers. Since the value of equity compensation depends on the market price of shares, in order to make their compensation policy efficient, firms may have to makes adjustments when investor sentiment is high and the share price is deviant from its fundamental value. With a sample of 9,202 managers in 1,344 Taiwanese companies, we document two important findings. First, stocks indeed are more likely to be over-valued when investor sentiment is high. Second, companies in Taiwan do actively manage their compensation policies. We find that CEO pay is correlated with operating performance to a greater extent and correlated with stock performance to a lesser extent when sentiment is high, indicating firms take into account sentiment when choosing the CEO performance measures. Our evidence is in support of the view that Taiwanese companies efficiently manage their executive compensation policies and pursue maximal shareholder value.
    Appears in Collections:[財務金融研究所] 博碩士論文

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