| 摘要: | 臺灣銀行業財務績效、內部人持股及董監事薪
酬重要影響因素研析
摘要
本論文主要目的在針對影響銀行業公司治理成效的三項重要因素進行研析，並探討其相互間的關聯性，包括了對銀行財務績效(ROA、ROE)之主要影響因素，內部人持股比例以及董監事薪酬之重要影響因素進行實證探討，分列於三個章節，其中二、三章在探討內部人持股比例與財務績效間之相互關連性，第四章在探討董監薪酬與財務績效及內部人間的關聯性，摘要如后:
第二章「銀行財務績效(ROA、ROE)的主要影響因素」:在探討存在內部性問題的前提之下，探討內部人持股比例與銀行經營績效是否存在顯著的關聯性。基於內部訊息及薪酬制度，二者間存在著高度複雜的關聯性，經過文獻探討，認為財務績效與內部人持股比例二者之間存在著內生性關係，追蹤型資料二階段最小平方法迴歸模型(two stage least squares for panel data model )來進行計量經濟分析，發現銀行業內部人持股與財務績效ROA二者關係是呈倒S型的關聯性。
這顯示金融監督管理委員會應基於「利益掠奪假說」及「利益收斂假說」並存於銀行業，將其列為法制與管理的基本要旨，亦即基於經營績效會隨著內部持股人之持股比例變動而變動的觀點，在訂定相關金融法規時，將經營權與內部所有權做某程度的規範。
第三章「內部人持股比例重要影響因素實證研究」:參考過去的文獻，應變數多儘對單一績效指標進行探討。然而，為避免單一財務指標產生的不完備，本章以財務績效指標(roa、roe)為解釋變數，以實證方式探討其對內部人持股比例是否會產生不同實證結果，藉以觀察二變數間的相互關聯性。結果發現其關聯性因此而不同。
此外，本研究以國內銀行業作為研究對象，採用不同的董監事會規模、衡量股權結構的變數（包含內部人持股以及法人機構持股比例）與不同的財務績效衡量（ROA & ROE）來探討各種可能的關聯性。
經實證結果顯示，內部人持股比例受財務績效影響顯著，二者間具有內生性，且相互影響。此外，當持股比例超過50%時，財務績效表現越優良的情形之下，內部人持股多傾向於調節持股。因為在可取得主導地位時，多持股以增加風險，不如高檔時調節，等低檔時再承接。此外，台灣銀行業的內部人持股比例，並不受各種董監事酬金所影響。
第四章「銀行業董監事薪酬重要影響因素之實證研究」:
主要在探討上市櫃銀行業董監事薪酬的重要影響因素，將董監事薪酬結構區分為非誘因性薪酬(董監事報酬與董監事業務執行費)與誘因性薪酬(董事酬勞與紅利)及董監總薪酬三類再加以研析將總樣本區分為金融海嘯前後、金控與非金控所屬銀行以及公股色彩銀行、民營銀行六個子樣本，分別探討其薪酬給付情形。即便法律規定須在年報中說明董監事薪酬與經營績效之關聯，但總樣本及子樣本關於銀行之薪酬結構，均未曾顯著的將財務績效反映於薪酬高低水準之上。惟金融海嘯以後，就營業利益相較於同業平均水準而言，表現越佳者，其董監事總酬金與誘因性薪酬越高。此外風險指標(BIS)與薪酬亦無顯著之關聯性。
銀行財務績效與內部人持股比例之間存在著相互影響的關係，但薪酬發放與財務績效則是脫鉤的，足見薪酬委員會成立至今，其效果不彰，有待監理機關修法改善。其他影響因素如董監薪酬會將同業的營業利益間相對績效好壞納入參考。此外，非誘因性薪酬通常會受同業經營相對績效影響，比如財務績效與銀行平均水準之間的差(配適值)呈顯著的正相關。董監事薪酬似乎亦非激勵銀行財務績效的萬靈丹，但內部人持股以及銀行與同業經營績效間的差額相對高低卻是影響董監酬勞的一項利器。上述特性與一般產業有所不同。
歸納上述研究結果，就本文影響公司治理的三項主要因素中內部人持股比例(股權結構)才是問題的核心， 2007年為杜防「肥貓」產生，金管會認為董監事支付薪酬應考量經營績效及風險。當時認為，此舉或許可以收立竿見影之效，但此時，經過實證研究，似有改善空間，但對於內部人持股比例進行研析監理似乎才是正本清源之道。
圖1-1 財務績效、內部人持股比例以及董監事薪酬相互間之關聯性
;The Important Factor Analysis for Taiwan Banking Industry about the Financial Performance、Insider Shareholding and the Remuneration of the Directors and Supervisors
Abstract
The thesis was focus on the important factors that influence the performance of the corporate governance about the banking industry in Taiwan. It analyzes about the main factors of financial performance (ROA, ROE) 、remuneration of directors and supervisors and insider (supervisors 、boards and managers , etc) shareholding .
The thesis covered three topics which were summarized as below:
In chapter 2 analyses the main factors which affect the financial performance (ROA, ROE) of the banking industry. According to the published literature, that there is an endogenous relationship between the financial performance and insiders ownership, based on the remuneration system and the internal information mechanism. So as to use the two stage least squares for panel data model to analyze the relationship between the proportion of internal shareholders shareholding and the financial performace ROA and ROE. As a result , the analysis find that the relationships of the proportion the proportion of internal shareholders shareholding internal shareholders shareholding between 25%-100% are showed as inverted S-type.
Apperantly, the conflict of interest hypothesis and the interest convergence hypothesis coexist in the banking industry, the Financial Supervisory Commission should pay attention to the result of the analysis to control the portion of insider shareholding when manage the banking sector and design the mechanism to determinine the relevant financial regulations.
Chapter3 concerns the empirical research of the important factors analysis of the proportion of insider shareholding :
In order to avoid a single financial indicator is incomplete to show to real condition. In this study, focus on the domestic banking sector as research subjects using different variables to measure the equity structure so as to analyze the relationship with ROA and ROE.
The empirical results show that the relationship between the proportion of insider ownership and financial performance, with endogenous. When the financial performance is excellent, the insider will decline the insider ownership stake because they have gotten the dominant position , to keep more shares will gain nothing but increase the higher risk ,so the insiders will adjust the ratio of portion. They should increace the portion of insider ownership when the financial performance decreased to the lower condition.By the way, the proportion of insider ownership is not affected by remuneration of board of directors and supervisors.
The remuneration analysis of board of directors and supervisors were classified into three types, they are non-incentive、incentive and total remuneration of board and directors and supervisors.
The total sample is divided into before and after the financial crisis, a financial holding company and non-financial holding company banks , government holding shares banks, private share holding banks ,etc .There are six sub-samples, to explore their remuneration payments situation respectively.The paper found that there is not any relationship between the financial performance and remuneration of board.
According to the regulation that the bank should disclosure the relationship between the remuneration of board and financial performance in the annual report, but the empirical analysis found the remuneration of banking industry without any significant relationship with financial performance. But after the tsunami , the empirical analysis find that the higher deviation of operating interest with the average level of operation interest of the banking industry, the higher incentive remuneration of directors and directors than before will happened.By the way,there is not any significant correlation between the risk indicator (BIS) and the remuneration either.
To summarize the results above, the three main factors that affect corporate governance in the thesis, the insider ownership structure is the core of the problem. Keep fat cats from happening generation, the FSC think the remuneration to directors and supervisors should connect the performance and risk in 2007.The way can solve the「Fat Cat」problem immediately. But to manage the insider ownership structure is more important way to solve the agency problem. |
