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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/66848


    Title: 離職後競業禁止約款之適法性研究-以人才流動自由化為政策取向;The Law and Policy of Covenants Not to Compete: Why We Need Greater Talent Mobility
    Authors: 黃宇良;Huang,Yu-liang
    Contributors: 產業經濟研究所
    Keywords: 競業禁止;僱傭契約限制性約款;合理性原則;人才流動;加州商業及專業法;營業秘密;non-compete clause;restrictive covenant in employment contract;talent mobility;rule of reason;California Business and Professions Code;trade secret
    Date: 2014-11-12
    Issue Date: 2015-03-16 15:50:51 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 國立中央大學
    Abstract: 在契約自由原則之下,雇主藉由與員工簽訂離職後競業禁止約款以保護其特定商業利益,員工於離職後的職業自由也因此而受到契約所訂內容之限制。多數國家通常由法院在個案中對涉訟的約款進行審查,若該約款所施加的限制被法院認定為合理者,法院將同意執行雇主的請求;然而,對於某些對員工與社會施加不合理限制的約款,法院將否認其效力並禁止雇主於訴訟上的請求。然而,某些國家或區域政府卻嚴格禁止大部分競業禁止約款的執行。最知名的例子為美國加州,該州自1872年起即立法明文禁止境內僱傭契約限制性約款的執行,法院亦遵循該法進行個案的審判。該法彰顯加州追求自由競爭與促進人才流動的政策決定,其獨特的政策模式更成為其他州政府仿效的對象。

    加州長期以來對上述政策的堅持,乃因落實該政策確實能發揮某些正面的效果,特別是對境內高科技產業群聚的發展有明顯的助益。國外部分由各領域學者合作完成的跨領域研究文獻,不僅證實加州促進人才流動的公共政策與該州優異的產業創新與創業表現之關聯,也提供政策制定者不同面向的資訊以作為參考。事實上大部分研究都存在類似的結論,即在特定區域內離職後競業禁止約款的執行若相當普遍,則各廠商間的人才流動將會受到阻礙。長期而言,將會對該區域的經濟發展造成某些負面的影響,包括該區域的潛在創業與創新機會遭到扼殺。

    本文將觀察美國各州政府對於僱傭契約限制性約款所採取的公共政策,以及各州法院對於涉訟案件所採取的審查標準,以作為檢討臺灣相關法規範的比較法研究對象。此外,本文將參考國外經濟學、心理學、商業管理學的相關文獻,探討離職後競業禁止約款對雇主、員工以及區域的整體經濟之影響。最後,本文將提出具體的政策建議與配套措施方案。並藉由經濟分析的研究方法,解釋為何政府立法禁止離職後競業禁止約款的執行,將能促進勞雇雙方的利益,並塑造一個有利於創新活動的產業環境。
    ;Under civil law, individuals and groups have right to form contracts without government restrictions. Consequently, in modern society, employers may use covenant not to compete (hereinafter CNC) as a means to protect their business interests; whereas employees’ benefits may to some degree limited. And that cause decades of disharmony in employer-employee relationship. To deal with this controversial issue, according to literature analysis, the courts in most countries, tend to perform a case-by-case analysis of each contract, to determine whether the restriction is reasonable or not. However, there exists several exceptions that CNC is strictly prohibited; State of California is the icon among them.

    It’s been more than a hundred years since 1872, as the California Business and Professions Code became effective. The code reflects the direction of policy of the government of California: facilitating market competition as well as talent mobility. This kind of policy has brought industries in California into great success, especially high-tech-intensive industry. And this unique policy model has been followed up by other states recently. The great effort of California is proven to be highly related to its distinct policy, not only in light of literature review in law-economic area, but also in interdisciplinary studies. In brief, if CNC is legal in a certain state, the talent mobility will probably be bound by contract. In the long run, from economic point of view, negative effect to the market, industries may come into being without a doubt.

    The article will take policies, judicial constraints on employment contract and important related cases in the United States as example, collect and analyze studies in different academic fields such as psychology, business management, economic, etc., to try to come up with some advises to current relevant legal framework in Taiwan.
    Appears in Collections:[產業經濟研究所] 博碩士論文

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