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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/71195


    Title: 探討未知風險態度下以買回合約制定合約組合;Portfolio of Contracts under the Buyback Contract for Unknown Risk Attitude
    Authors: 黃冠淳;Huang,Guan-Chun
    Contributors: 工業管理研究所
    Keywords: 報童問題;協同機制;均值-方差分析;買回合約;Newsvendor Problem;Coordination Mechanism;Mean-Variance Analysis;Buyback Contract
    Date: 2016-07-20
    Issue Date: 2016-10-13 12:11:52 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 國立中央大學
    Abstract: 供應鏈協調已在許多研究中被廣泛的討論,部份的文獻假設其情境為風險中立的供應鏈成員。然而,風險態度除了中立態度之外,還有風險偏好與風險趨避兩種風險態度,單以風險中立態度是無法完整呈現供應鏈成員的行為。因此,在本研究中,我們在報童模型下討論當供應商面臨風險趨避零售商時,如何達成通路協調消弭雙邊際效應。為了達成供應鏈的協同合作,許多學者發展了許多協同機制,如:數量折扣、買回、數量彈性、營收分享合約等。
    由於零售商承擔存貨風險,因此零售商對風險的感受會影響其所做的決定。一般而言,風險趨避的零售商在面對不確定需求的情形下,訂購量相較於風險中立的零售商較少。然而,較少的訂購量將使得供應商與零售商的獲利相對減少。
    在本研究將探討銷售買回合約下,供應商提供合作機制給風險趨避零售商,依據零售商不同的風險趨避程度來探討買回合約,供應商提供合約給零售商以增加彼此利潤;所以當供應商面對風險趨避的零售商時,應考量其風險態度來訂定合約與決策。
    ;Coordination of supply chain has been widely discussed in many research. Some of them only discussed the situation of risk-neutral agents. However, the assumption of risk-neutral seems to be inadequate for the supply chain in reality. Hence, in this study, we discussed the newsvendor model with risk-averse retailer. To eliminate the double marginalization, scholars extended many methods. Such as quantity discount, buyback, quantity flexibility, Sales-rebate and revenue sharing contracts and so on.
    As retailers bear the inventory and shortage risk, therefore retailer’s risk feelings will affect their decision made. Generally, the risk-averse retailer face with the case of uncertain demand, her order quantity will lower than risk-neutral retailer. However, lower order quantities will let supplier and retailer profit decreased.
    In this research, we discuss under buyback contract, supplier provide a cooperation mechanism to risk aversion retailers, based on different degree of risk aversion retailers to explore the extent of buyback contract, to discuss buyback contract re, suppliers offer a contract to retailers to increase profits each other. So when suppliers face a risk aversion retailers should consider the risk attitude to make the decision and design contract.
    Appears in Collections:[工業管理研究所 ] 博碩士論文

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