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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/71835


    Title: 金融業理財專員獎酬辦法探討與績效評估
    Authors: 李壹明;Li,Yi-Ming
    Contributors: 高階主管企管碩士班
    Keywords: 財富管理銷售規範;績效評估;獎酬制度;Wealth management sale standard;performance evaluation;rewarding system
    Date: 2016-06-23
    Issue Date: 2016-10-13 13:56:42 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 國立中央大學
    Abstract: 自1980年代以來,投資行為早已是全民運動,當時以工時或勞力所換得的基本薪資之主動所得以外,更有運用租賃或以錢賺錢的收益方式來獲得投資所得。隨著國民所得的增加,每個人都有理財的需求,從最簡單的儲蓄存款行為到複雜程度相對高的結構型商品,依程度及偏好的不同均有投資者參與其中,故當投資者有需要從事投資及理財活動時,最簡單的方式即是經由從事財富管理業務之銀行或金融機構進行,財富管理業務因此順勢發展,同時為了提供客戶更多元的服務,故規劃了理財專員的配置。
    景氣循環過程,投資市場必定會有高低起伏之現象,投資人及辦理財富管理業務之銀行及理專在享受市場上漲的氣氛時,是否也能記取市場下跌的教訓而能忠實的面對客戶的資產及給予良善的投資建議,均考驗著理專的職業道德,因理專擔負著銀行及投資者的橋樑,銀行希望理專能創造更多的無風險收入,客戶亦希望理專能為其創造超額報酬,而理專亦想要為自己創造更多的獎金收入,如此的利益衝突及交錯下,銀行的績效獎酬評估辦法及主管機關的銷售行為規範制定,均扮演重極為要的角色。
    回顧傳統的績效與獎酬制度,均是以設法提升理財專員的交易量能為主,使得理財專員可能為了個人的年度績效考核及業績獎金,販售高額手續費計算績效的商品給客戶,以賺取更多的手續費收入。也因為販售之商品未經適切完整的評估及與顧客詳實溝通說明,即產生了理財專員的銷售道德風險,造成時有所聞的不當銷售之客訴問題產生。當然,要如何創造嶄新的產品和行銷考核評估模式的確有其難度,同時未來如何透過一個良好的制度建立,讓人才發揮所長是更值得分析及探討,故本研究是針對銀行業理財專員的績效評估和獎酬制度的設計進行分析,藉以探討並了解理專的獎酬辦法與銀行業的獲利能力是否呈正相關、績效獎酬的評核標準、理財專員的價值觀及其道德風險又應該如何規避等,以建立理專完整的績效奬酬評估辦法作為參考。
    故績效評估及獎酬辦法應建立一套合理且公平的標準,更不應該只交給績效考核單位獨自擬定辦法,理應加入與本項業務相關的各層人員共同研擬,才能真正反應出績效獎酬辦法建立的價值及效果,管理者也應本著育才及留才的做為,建立良好及友善的獎酬制度,設法降低理專工作獎酬及目標不對等的問題產生,同時績效獎酬辦法也應以簡單易懂的方式設計,讓參與者易於掌握而有共鳴,並將經管客戶資產活化擬定為評估考核要項,非以實質手續費收入單向評估,以提升顧客服務品質及達到財富管理多元配置的作為。;Since 1980s, the investment behavior already has been a national activity. At that time, people obtained investment gains by spending salaries based on labor force, even by leasing finance and by money making money. Along with the national income increase, each people all had the demand of managing finances. Through different preferences, investors participated in financing activities from the simple savings deposit to the relatively complex structure commodity. The simplest way to engage in investment and manage money is via banks and financial institutions. Therefore, the wealth management service developed. In order to provide customer multiple services, financial consultants were allocated.
    The investment market must fluctuate with the business cycle. Hence, when the investors, financial consultants and banks with wealth management services all enjoy the periods of expansion, would they remember the lesson during recession periods? Meanwhile, would the financial consultants faithfully face the customers’ properties and give them appropriate investment suggestions which is testing the financial consultants’ occupational ethics. Since financial consultants are the bridge between the bank and investors. The banks hope the financial consultants can create more non-risk income while the investors hope the financial consultants to earn exceed return for them. Moreover, the financial consultants also want to get more bonus of their own. In this conflicts of interests, the banks’ rewarding system based on performance and the authority′s sale standard both play extremely important role.
    Review traditional performance evaluation and rewarding system, we find out that they are primarily about promoting financial consultants to rise trading volume, which may cause financial consultants to sell commodities of high performance and high commission to customers. Thus, financial consultants can earn higher sales bonus and individual annual performance review. Since the commodity is not appropriately evaluated and interpreted to customers, the financial consultants’ moral hazard and customers’ complaints events happen again and again. Certainly, creating a brand-new performance evaluation pattern to establish a well-behaved system is really difficult. Therefore, in this paper, we analyze the design of performance and the rewarding system for financial consultants. Through the analysis, we discuss about whether the rewarding system and banks’ ability to earn profits are positive correlation or not. Besides, the performance and reward rating standard, the financial consultants’ value system, moral hazard, etc. are considered. With our analysis, we make a reference for constructing a complete rewarding system which can let talented people do themselves justice and solve the problem of moral hazard.
    To sum up, a performance and rewarding system should be in line with a reasonable and fair standard. Besides, the rewarding system should not only be drawn up by the performance evaluation department, each service related personnel should participates in the performance and rewarding system together to react real value and the effect. The administrator should stand on fostering talent and retain talent while establishing a well-behaved and friendly performance and rewarding system. Also, the administrator should try to reduce the non-coincidence between financial consultants’ reward and goal. An ideal rewarding system should be clear and simple to evoke resonant with the participants. Most importantly, rather than only depending on real commission, activation of customers’ property must be included for performance evaluation so as to enhance service quality and wealth management complex disposition.
    Appears in Collections:[高階主管企管(EMBA)碩士班] 博碩士論文

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