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    题名: 共同成員及執行長誘因薪酬;Common Membership and CEO Incentive Compensation
    作者: 葉筱靖;Yeh,Hsiao-Ching
    贡献者: 會計研究所
    关键词: 共同成員;審計及薪酬委員會成員重疊;經理人誘因薪酬支付比例;公司績效;盈餘管理;common membership;overlapping membership;CEO incentive pay;firm performance;earnings management
    日期: 2016-07-19
    上传时间: 2016-10-13 14:09:55 (UTC+8)
    出版者: 國立中央大學
    摘要: 本篇論文主要在探討薪酬委員會成員同時為審計委員會成員時,是否會對經理人誘因薪酬制定之效率及效果造成影響。本研究之樣本期間為2003至2010年,共5,828間公司-年觀察值,包含經理人相關資料、公司財務資訊及董事會資料。研究結果發現在總樣本之下,公司有共同成員與經理人誘因薪酬、公司績效及公司真實績效呈現顯著負相關,意味著公司若有重疊成員的話,有可能會造成經理人降低努力誘因及抑制經理人追求風險,同時也讓公司績效及真實績效下降。本研究進一步切割整體樣本後發現,績效較佳之公司,重疊成員與公司績效及真實績效呈現顯著正相關、與盈餘管理呈現顯著負相關,指出績效較好之公司,審計及薪酬委員會成員重疊是一個好的機制,會減緩盈餘管理之產生,以及增加未被管理之績效。;This paper is to investigate whether the compensation committee members who also serve on the audit committee affect the efficiency and effectiveness of CEO incentive compensation or not. This study uses a sample of 5,828 firm-year observation for the period 2003 to 2010 in the US firms. Including CEO related data, firm’s financial data and director data. We find a significantly negative relationship between common membership and CEO incentive pay and a significantly negative relation between common membership and reported and real performance on the full sample. The implication is that common membership may cause the CEO reduced the effort incentive and decreased risk-taking. Also, common membership may decline the firm’s reported performance and unmanaged performance on the whole sample. Furthermore, we distinguish the full sample and find that firms with good performance is a significantly positive relationship between common membership and reported and real performance, and significantly negative relationship between common membership and earnings management. That means firm with better performance has the compensation committee members who also serve on the audit committee is a good mechanism to ease the earnings management and increase unmanaged performance.
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