本研究將產業競爭視為一種外部的公司治理機制，欲了解公司所處經營環境的產業競爭外生變數，對購併績效之影響。本研究發現處於競爭產業的公司會有顯著較高的購併宣告異常報酬，支持產業競爭能夠監督管理當局做出更好的投資決策，以及避免公司做建立自己王國的購併損害股東價值。其次，處於競爭產業的公司會傾向執行水平式購併降低產業競爭，並且有顯著較高的購併宣告異常報酬；此外，競爭產業也偏好複合式購併，但是其購併宣告的異常報酬卻低於一般產業和獨特產業。另一方面，處於不完全競爭的公司會藉由垂直整合提高進入障礙和避免競爭對手早一步整合以增加市場力量，但購併宣告的異常報酬不顯著為正。;Given industry competition is regarded as one of the external corporate governance mechanism, this study analyzes the impact of industry competition, a natural exogenous variable, on the performance of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find that acquirers in competitive industries experience significantly higher abnormal announcement return than those in noncompetitive industries. This result indicates that industry competition has a disciplinary effect on managerial slacks and prevents managers from empire-building acquisitions that are detrimental to shareholder value. In addition, acquirers in competitive industries prefer horizontal acquisitions, which can effectively mitigate industry competition, and such type of deals experiences significantly higher abnormal return than benchmarks. Acquirers in competitive industries also prefer conglomerate acquisitions, but this type of acquisition suffers a significantly negative announcement returns. On the other hand, acquirers in unique industries can strengthen their bargaining power and increase barriers to entry by engaging in vertical acquisitions. However, the announcement returns on such type of deals are insignificantly positive.
