| 摘要: | 本研究主要探討 CEO 與 CFO 選擇權持股誘因比率間之差異與股價崩盤風險之關聯,並 加入沙賓法案實施前後作為對照環境,探討沙賓法案對於上述關聯影響。股價崩盤之發 生為資訊不對稱及代理問題所導致,經理人有誘因為了自身利益而隱瞞壞消息,當壞消 息積累至一定程度後,壞消息之大量曝光使得公司面臨股價崩盤之風險。過往文獻多為 探討 CEO 及 CFO 單一角色對於公司績效之影響,或是以管理團隊作為探討之主體,比 如錦標賽理論、社會比較理論;然而少有研究探討身為公司主要決策制定者的 CEO 與 CFO 間之相互關係。沙賓法案通過後,CEO 與 CFO 須對財務報表及相關揭露負保證責 任並加重了潛在刑責,對 CEO 及 CFO 之行為選擇產生影響。本研究以美國 1995 年至 2013 年所有上市公司為樣本,並分為沙賓法案前後測試沙賓法案對於 CEO 及 CFO 選擇 權持股誘因比率間之差異與股價崩盤風險之關聯產生的影響。此外,過去研究發現產業 競爭程度能夠誘使經理人最大化公司長久利益以排除掉產業間較不具獲利性之公司,且 產業競爭能提升市場資訊透明度。是故,進一步探討 CEO 與 CFO 選擇權持股誘因比率 間之差異及產業競爭程度之交乘項與股價崩盤風險之關聯。本研究發現,股價崩盤風險 與經理選擇權持股誘因比率差異非為線性關係。沙賓法案實施前,惟有在產業競爭下, 選擇權持股誘因比率越是相近,發生股價崩盤的風險越低,代表產業競爭能夠減緩資訊 接露要求低的不利影響,經理人間傾向於合作關係,提升公司與投資人間資訊之流通; 然而當選擇權持股誘因比率高至一定程度,發生股價崩盤之風險則會降低,因而推測選 擇權持股誘因比率之差異越大會造成經理人間之激勵因子,促使經理人為公司長久利益 經營而較少囤積壞消息。然而這樣的關聯性在沙賓法案實施後便不顯著,表示高度之聲 明保證及刑事責任使得產業競爭下之選擇權持股誘因比率間之差異與股價崩盤風險之 關聯不為顯著。;In this study, we examine the relation between the gap of incentive option ratio between CEO and CFO and stock price crash risk, and discuss how the effect of Sarbanes Oxley Act to affect the above relation. Stock price crash risk is result from asymmetric information and agency problem, and managers have incentives to hoard unfavorable operating outcomes. Much of prior research focuses on the relation between single-agent either CEO or CFO and firm performance, or the effect on top executive which be considered as a team to firm value, (e.g. tournament theory or social comparison theory.) Minority literature focuses on the function between CEO and CFO who are the firm’s key decision maker. After the passage of Sarbanes Oxley Act, CEO and CFO’s responsibility for financial integrity has been highly emphasized and the penalty is more stringent than before. That would affect their decision-making behavior. Thus, we use a large sample of U.S. firms for the period 1995–2013, and divided the sample into pre-SOX (1995-2001) and post-SOX (2002-2013) period to examine the SOX effect on the relation between the gap of incentive option ratio between CEO and CFO and stock price crashes. Furthermore, prior researches find that the product market competition can incentivize managers to maximize long-term firm value by forcing unprofitable firms out of the business. Thus, we further discuss the relation between the interactions of the incentive option ratio gap with product market competition and stock price crash risk. We document that in the pre-SOX period, the interaction between the gap of incentive option ratio between CEO and CFO and product market competition is significantly positive to crash risk, however the relation is opposite when their interest is not so closed. Post-SOX, the interaction between the gap of incentive option ratio between CEO and CFO and product market competition is non- significantly. To sum up, these results suggest that in pre-SOX period, the competitive environment could mitigate the bad effect of lower requirement from government, but the relation is non-significant in the post-SOX period. |
