近幾年來，許多的文獻討論機構投資人所扮演對公司監督的角色。由於資訊的取得、投資的技巧以及投資的部位，一般人均認為機構投資人對公司監督的角色優於散戶，若機構投資人對於公司經營績效或是經理人的決策不滿，可以透過賣出的威脅來經理人施加壓力。然而，不同的機構投資人類別對於提升公司治理與改善公司經營績效的影響力是不同的。本計畫書提出三年期的計畫，透過執行三個實證的研究計畫，包括探討被動式機構投資人的持股改變對於公司有形與無形資產的投資與長期經營績效的影響、機構投資人在併購的監督角色、以及機構投資人在私募發行的監督角色，來探討上述的問題。 ;A large body of literature documents the monitoring role of institutional investors on monitoring the corporate. Due to the information acquisition, investment skill, and investment position, institutional investors are believed to have better ability in monitoring and intervening management team than individual investors. If institutional investors dissatisfy the performance or the decisions of managers, they can discipline the management team through the threat of selling shares and “exit” the firm. However, different types of institutional investors have differential impact on the promoting corporate governance and improving operating performance. In this three-year proposal, we will carry on three empirical studies, including examine the impact change of the passive institutional investor ownership on the long-term investment in tangible and intangible assets and operating performance, the monitoring role of institutional investors in the acquisitions, and the monitoring role of institutional investors in private placements of common equity, to address the issue.