本研究利用2008年到2016年中國上市公司為對象，透過Panel data analysis迴歸模型檢驗獨立董事的政治連結、投資效率與公司績效間之關係。實證結果發現 (1) 獨立董事的政治連結在非國有企業樣本中與企業的獲利能力具有正向關係；在國有企業樣本中不論中央政府控制或地方政府控制的國有企業，獨立董事的政治連結與企業的獲利能力都有著負向關係；(2) 獨立董事的政治連結對於企業的投資效率之關係於非國有企業樣本中不顯著；在國有企業樣本中，不論中央政府控制或地方政府控制，獨立董事的政治連結對於企業的投資效率之關係皆呈現為過度投資的情形；(3) 於樣本中觀察出獨立董事的政治連結並非藉由投資效率的管道而影響公司績效。本研究之管理意涵為：(1) 企業於董事改選提名時，應審慎評估政治連結所帶來的效益與成本；(2) 投資人進行投資決策時，除基本應評估之項目外，亦應衡量董事會結構對公司績效之影響。;This study examines the relationship among independent director′ political connection, investment efficiency and firm performance. Panel data analysis is utilized and the data are from Chinese listed firms over the period 2008-2016. The empirical results show that (1) the political connection of independent directors is positively related to the profitability of enterprises in non-state-owned enterprises (Non-SOEs), the relationship is negative for both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) controlled by the central government and those controlled by local governments. (2) The political connection of independent directors is not significantly associated with investment efficiency in Non-SOEs, however, both SOEs controlled by the central government and those controlled by local governments overinvest. (3) The political connection of independent directors does not affect firm performance through the channel of investment efficiency. The management implications of this study are: (1) In the nomination of politically connected independent directors, companies should take into consideration of both costs and benefits from the political connection. (2) Investors should also measure the impact of board structure on firm performance in making investment decisions.
