本計畫藉由探討年(季)報中經理人討論與分析之揭露對會計異常反應的影響，以證實此一質性揭露是否具有資訊內涵。第一年計畫認為前瞻性揭露可以緩和市場參與者對盈餘公告的不足反應。前述揭露的可驗證性愈大，緩和效果愈大。 第二年與第三年計畫認為，管理當局基於訊息傳遞與投機動機紀錄裁量性應計項目。第二年計畫認為，訊息傳遞(投機)型經理人，較會(不會)進行前瞻性與會計政策之揭露，應計項目有較少(多)估計成份。前述揭露有助於降低訊息傳遞(投機)型裁量性應計項目，裁量性應計項目之錯誤評價。 第三年計畫認為，前瞻性揭露語調可(無法)用來強化訊息傳遞(投機)型裁量性應計項目的資訊傳遞(誤導)效果。淨樂觀語調是指樂觀語調減悲觀語調。訊息傳遞(投機)型裁量性應計項目與淨樂觀語調正(沒有)相關。一致性(不一致)的揭露語調是指訊息傳遞型裁量性應計項目與淨樂觀語調方向一致(不一致)。當資訊不確定較低(高)時，訊息傳遞型的經理人較會發展一致性(不一致)的揭露語調。一致性(不一致)的前瞻性揭露語調會增加(不會增加)裁量性應計項目持續度，有助於(無法)降低訊息傳遞(投機)型裁量性應計項目，與裁量性應計項目之錯誤評價。 ;This project extends prior research on the information content of qualitative MD&A disclosures in 10-K filings by examining whether they attenuate the post-earnings announcement drift and accrual anomaly. The first-year project argues that the forward-looking MD&A disclosures reduce information uncertainty and thus facilitate investors' and analysts' responses to previous earnings surprises. The more verifiable the forward-looking MD&A disclosures, the stronger their effects on reducing both investor and analyst underreaction to previous announced earnings will be. The second-year and the third-year projects suggest that managers have two major motivations to record discretionary accruals, namely, opportunistic purposes and signaling purposes. Thus, discretionary accruals are decomposed into signaling-driven and opportunistic-driven discretionary accruals. The second-year project argues that managers with signaling (opportunistic) motivations are more (less) likely to engage in forward-looking and Critical Accounting Policies disclosures, with a less (greater) amount of estimation in accruals. It is argued that these disclosures in the MD&A section of 10-K filings arising from managers' two major motivations will help inform investors of the persistence of both signaling-driven and opportunistic-driven discretionary accruals and thus attenuate the mispricing of signaling-driven (opportunistic-driven) discretionary accruals and total discretionary accruals. The third-year project argues that managers with signaling motivations to record discretionary accruals credibly use forward-looking disclosure tone in MD&A disclosures in conjunction with discretionary accruals to convey their private information of future prospects, whereas managers with opportunistic motivations to record discretionary accruals are less likely to disclose pseudo forward-looking tone to mislead investors for fear of potential litigation risk. Every sentence in the forward-looking MD&A disclosure is classified into one of four tones: optimistic, neutral, pessimistic, or uncertain, while net optimistic forward-looking tone is defined as the difference between the optimistic words and the pessimistic words scaled by total number of words in the MD&A disclosures. Holding information uncertainty constant, it is posited that signaling-type managers are more likely to disclose optimistic (pessimistic) forward-looking tone when facing income-increasing (income-decreasing) discretionary accruals, while net optimistic forward-looking tone is not related to opportunistic-driven discretionary accruals. In addition, the positive association between signaling-driven discretionary accruals and net optimistic forward-looking tone is more pronounced when facing lower information uncertainty. Furthermore, it is posited that signaling-type managers may choose either a confirmatory or non-confirmatory forward-looking tone depending on the extent of information uncertainty. The confirmatory (non-confirmatory) forward-looking tone means that the net optimistic forward-looking tone is in the same (opposite) direction as the signs of the signaling-driven discretionary accruals. It is posited that a confirmatory forward-looking tone helps inform investors of the two major motivations for recording discretionary accruals thereby attenuating the mispricing of signaling-driven (opportunistic-driven) discretionary accruals and total discretionary accruals, while non-confirmatory forward-looking tone is unable to attenuate these accrual anomalies.
