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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/83605


    Title: 家族企業董事會結構與企業社會責任之關聯性;The Relevance of Family Business Board Structure and Corporate Social Responsibility
    Authors: 宋易儒;Sung, Yi Ju
    Contributors: 財務金融學系
    Keywords: 家族企業;董事會結構;公司治理;企業社會責任;family corporate;director structure;corporate governance;CSR
    Date: 2020-06-29
    Issue Date: 2020-09-02 16:42:58 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 國立中央大學
    Abstract: 本研究主要目的在探討家族企業董事會結構對於企業社會責任之影響。樣本使用台灣上市上櫃公司,共1383家公司,11064個樣本。研究結果顯示,台灣家族企業在企業社會責任表現上,比非家族企業表現還差。董事會結構部分,家族企業董事會規模越大,會減弱在企業社責任表現。另外,家族企業獨立董事比例越高,會增強企業社會責任表現。若家族企業董事長兼任總經,會減弱企業社會責任表現。家族企業若有控制權與現金流量權偏離的情形,會減弱企業社會責任表現,這也代表著台灣家族企業普遍使用交叉持股和金字塔結構掌握權力,削弱公司治理,造成「核心代理問題」。最後,家族企業經理人持股比越高,經理人越有誘因要保護自身利益,比較不會做出傷害公司價值的行為。;The purpose of this research wants to find the relationship between the board structure of family firms and CSR performance. I use companies which are listed on Taiwan exchange market and OTC market. There are 1383 companies and 11064 samples. The result shows that family firms on CSR performance are worse than non-family firms. Besides, bigger board size in family firms will deteriorate their CSR performance. And the higher the proportion of independent directors in a family business, the stronger the CSR performance. Also, if the chairman of the family business concurrently serves as CEO, it will reduce CSR performance. And if a family company has a deviation between control and cash flow rights, it will reduce CSR performance. This also represents the widespread use of cross-shareholdings and pyramid structures to control power in Taiwan′s family businesses, weakening corporate governance and causing "TypeⅡagency problem". Finally, the higher the shareholding ratio of family business managers, the more incentives managers have to protect their own interests, and less likely to harm the value of the company.
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute of Finance] Electronic Thesis & Dissertation

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