Lucky CEOs and earnings quality

NCU Institutional Repository > 管理學院 > 財務金融研究所 > 博碩士論文 > Item 987654321/83671

jsp.display-item.identifier=請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/83671

题名:	Lucky CEOs and earnings quality
作者:	張渝祥;Chang, Yu-Hsiang
贡献者:	財務金融學系
关键词:	經理人運氣;盈餘品質;應計項目盈餘品質;Lucky CEOs;Earnings quality;Accruals quality
日期:	2020-07-29
上传时间:	2020-09-02 16:52:09 (UTC+8)
出版者:	國立中央大學
摘要:	本研究檢測經理人運氣對盈餘品質之影響為何，並且參考Daniel, Li, and Navven (2019)的方法取得經理人運氣這項變數。運氣較好的經理人為了維持過往的表現或績效而去做較多的盈餘管理，因此我們假設運氣較好之經理會對盈餘品質造成負面影響。我們的研究結果與假設為一致，運氣較好之經理人會對裁量性應計項目、實質盈餘管理和財報重編產生正面影響，另外會對盈餘持續性及實質盈餘管理品質產生負向影響。大致上，我們的實證結果顯示經理運氣與盈餘品質有負向關係。此外，我們比較沙賓法案前後，經理人運氣對盈餘品質影響之變化。本研究發現運氣較好之經理人除了在沙賓法案後持續操弄應計項目的盈餘，並且顯著的增加了實質盈餘管理。;Our paper examines the causal relationship between earnings quality and lucky CEOs, and we obtain our measure, namely, lucky CEOs by Daniel, Li, and Navven (2019). We suggest that luckier CEOs are related to lower earnings quality. When CEOs′ performance is due to luck, they tend to enhance earnings management to maintain their performance. Our suggestion is consistent with results that lucky CEOs positively affect discretionary current accruals, real earnings management, and restatement. However, they negatively affect earnings persistence, and real earnings management quality. Our empirical evidence shows that managerial luck generally reduces earnings quality. Furthermore, we test the relationship between lucky CEOs and our earnings quality measure before and after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). We find that lucky CEOs still manage earnings with accrual-based earnings management and conduct more real earnings management after the passage of SOX.
显示于类别:	[財務金融研究所] 博碩士論文

文件中的档案:

档案	描述	大小	格式	浏览次数
index.html		0Kb	HTML	179	检视/开启

在NCUIR中所有的数据项都受到原著作权保护.

社群 sharing

数据加载中.....