本研究探討CEO持有的內部債務是否與下行風險相關，並研究內部（CEO 、公司特徵）和外部（產業競爭和總體經濟不確定性）因素對類債務薪酬的CEO內部債務與企業下行風險關係的影響。使用2006年至2019年的美國數據，我們發現持有更多內部債務的 CEO 可以降低更多的下行風險。然而，內部債務持有對下行風險的負向影響在年輕或男性CEO管理的公司中被抵消，而CEO持有的內部債務降低公司下行風險的能力於被過度自信CEO經營的公司中更具效果。 此外，降低下行風險的效果也凸顯於品質更好的公司（更高的盈餘品質、更小的規模、更低的財務槓桿、更高的現金餘額、更高的超額報酬與更高的獲利能力）。 最後，我們發現降低下行風險的效果在產業競爭度低、經濟政策不確定性低和股票市場波動性低的公司中更為明顯。;In this study, we investigate whether inside debts held by CEOs are associated with downside risk and also consider the impact of internal (CEOs’ and firms’ characteristics) and external (industry competition and macroeconomic uncertainty) factors on the connection between inside debt for CEO which is debt-like compensation and corporate downside risk. Using U.S. data from 2006 to 2019, we find that CEO who holds more inside debt reduces more downside risk. However, the negative impact of inside debt holding on downside risk would be offset in firms managed by younger or male CEOs, whereas the ability of inside debt held by CEO to decrease corporate downside risk would be amplified in firms operated by overconfident CEO. Besides, this reduction effect occurs in firms with good qualities (higher earnings quality, smaller size, lower leverage, higher cash surplus, higher excess returns, and higher profitability). Finally, we find this effect is more pronounced with firms operated in a low competitive industry, front low economic policy uncertainty and equity market volatility.
