本研究試圖探討人力資本流動及CEO固守職位對公司現金持有的影響。樣本鎖定在1992年至2019年的S&P1500公司CEO。本文利用法規IDD(Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine)當作人力資本流動限制的依據，利用雙重差分的方式探討法規前後對於公司現金持有的影響，此方法解決在研究人力資本流動的文章中常會出現的內生性問題，最後發現在法規IDD的影響下對於公司現金持有並沒有顯著結果，但是發現在採用IDD的情況下，CEO的固守職位高會導致公司現金持有的上升。本文更進一步透過法規Non-compete當作另一項人力資本流動的限制，但是在此部分的結果不顯著;In this paper, we investigate the impact of the human capital mobility and CEO entrenchment on corporate cash holdings. We use the S&P 1500 index listed companies from 1992 to 2019 as our main sample. We use the law of IDD (Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine) as the basis for restricting the flow of human capital and use the method of difference-in-differences to explore the impact on the company′s cash holdings. This method solves the endogeneity problem that often arises in paper studying human capital flows .The results show that there is no significant effect on corporate cash holdings under the influence of regulation IDD, but it is found that CEO entrenchment leads to an increase in corporate cash holdings when states 採用 the IDD. Moreover, we use the Non-compete covenant as another restriction on the flow of human capital and we find the results in this part are not significant.
