本研究係探討我國公司在宣告庫藏股買回實際執行比率所代表的資訊意涵。以證期會所公布於2014起至2022年「公司治理評鑑」排名成績的上市公司有宣告庫藏股買回資格者為樣本，與我國常見的公司治理的股權結構的制度之關係。本研究使用Panel Data Methods中的固定效果模型(Fixed eEffects Model)進行實證分析。 實證結果(一)對於公司宣告庫藏股實際買回執行比率與董監事、經理人及大股東持股比率為顯著負向顯著關係，結果發現庫藏股實際買回執行比率愈高，董監事、經理人及大股東持有比率愈低，公司內部的代理問題較高。(二)對於公司宣告庫藏股實際買回執行比率與董監事股票質押比率為顯著正向顯著關係，結果發現庫藏股實際買回執行比率愈低，董監事股票質押比率愈高，公司內部的代理問題較嚴重，透過宣告買回公司庫藏股傳遞訊號，炒作股價，故庫藏股實際買回執行比率偏低。(三)在公司宣告庫藏股實際買回執行比率與董監事席次比率為顯著負向顯著關係，結果發現庫藏股實際買回執行比率愈低，董監事席次比率愈高，缺少監督機制，公司內部的代理問題較大，透過傳遞宣告庫藏股買回的訊號，拉抬公司股價，藉以出脫所持有的公司股票，故庫藏股實際買回執行率偏低。 研究的結果亦可有助評估我國目前對於「上市上櫃公司買回本公司股份辦法」，多加庫藏股實際買回執行比率的規範。另外，對我國證期會發佈「公司治理評鑑」評鑑構面「維護股東權益」或「提升資訊透明度」的評鑑指標具有參考性，建議主管機關可將公司實施庫藏股實際買回比率列入的評鑑指標中，以提升及落實企業治理機制。 ;The purpose of this study is to explore the informational significance represented by the actual execution rate of share repurchase announcements. The Relationship Between Corporate Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance: A Case Study of Listed Companies in Taiwan′s Corporate Governance Evaluation.This study employs the Fixed Effects Model, a method within Panel Data Analysis, to conduct the empirical analysis. Empirical Results：1.The empirical results indicate a significant negative relationship between the actual execution rate of share repurchases announced by the company and the shareholding ratios of directors, supervisors, managers, and major shareholders. It was found that the higher the actual execution rate of share repurchases, the lower the shareholding ratios of directors, supervisors, managers, and major shareholders.2.The empirical results indicate a significant positive relationship between the actual execution rate of share repurchases announced by the company and the stock pledge ratio of directors and supervisors. It was found that the lower the actual execution rate of share repurchases, the higher the stock pledge ratio of directors and supervisors.3. The empirical results show a significant negative relationship between the actual execution rate of share repurchases announced by the company and the proportion of seats held by directors and supervisors. It was found that the lower the actual execution rate of share repurchases, the higher the proportion of seats held by directors and supervisors.
