摘要： This paper investigates the effects of an increase in ambiguity aversion and an increase in ambiguity in an insurance bargaining game with a risk-and-ambiguity-neutral insurer and a risk-and-ambiguity-averse client. Both a cooperative and a non-cooperative bargaining game are examined. We show that, in both games, full coverage is optimal in the presence of ambiguity, and that the optimal premium is higher in the presence of ambiguity than in the absence of it. Furthermore, the optimal premium will increase with both the degree of ambiguity aversion and an increase in ambiguity. •We examine both cooperative and non-cooperative insurance bargaining games.•In the presence of ambiguity, full coverage is optimal.•The optimal premium is higher in the presence than in the absence of ambiguity.•The optimal premium will increase with the degree of ambiguity aversion.•The optimal premium will increase with an increase in ambiguity. 出版者： Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V 出版日期： 2013-11-01 出處： Insurance, mathematics & economics, 2013-11, Vol.53 (3), p.812-820 資源來源： Elsevier ScienceDirect Journal Complete - AutoHoldings 版權： 2013 Elsevier B.V. 版權： Copyright Elsevier Sequoia S.A. Nov 2013 識別號： ISSN: 0167-6687 識別號： EISSN: 1873-5959 識別號： DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2013.10.001 識別號： CODEN: IMECDX
