本研究探討家族企業在投資行為上與一般企業是否有差異，分析家族股權集中程度對其投資現金流量敏感度的影響。研究發現家族企業相對於非家族企業有較低的投資現金流量敏感度，其原因在於家族企業面臨較低的融資成本以及經理人與股東之間的代理成本。然而，隨著家族所有權的集中，在家族股權中度集中下，其投資現金流量敏感度反而提升，出現大、小股東之間的代理問題與管理者據守的現象。以管理型態來做為干擾變數探討其對家族持股與投資現金流量敏感度關係的影響時，發現家族企業在董事長兼任總經理(CEO duality)的情況下會降低投資現金流量敏感度，支持忠僕理論(stewardship theory)。 We investigate the relationship between family businesses and investment-cash flow sensitivity in Taiwan— an economy that is characterized by a high degree of ownership in general and predominant family control in particular. Family business may not only reduce investment-cash flow sensitivity because of family control mitigating agency and asymmetric information problems but also increase investment-cash flow sensitivity for moderate levels of family ownership. Investment-cash flow sensitivity is lower in family-controlled firms with CEO duality, supporting the stewardship theory. Our results suggest that family control would be effective in mitigating investment distortions, but the entrenchment effect of the above-mentioned situations can aggravate investment distortions. CEO duality could reinforce a stewardship role in family firms.
