| 摘要: | 本文主要探討中國上市公司於所有權結構下對其股利政策之影響。由於因為中國特殊 之制度及背景,政治連結可能對公司決策產生影響,故本文再進而檢驗政治連結在不同 所有權結構下對其股利政策是否產生調節效果。研究樣本為中國深圳和上海股票交易所 上市公司,樣本起迄時間為 2008 年至 2014 年,採 OLS 迴歸模型做分析。實證結果發 現: 國外法人、國內法人及家族企業等非國有企業做為控制股東將傾向於配發較多現金 股利,而國有企業為最大股東傾向於配發較少現金股利,這顯示國外法人及國內法人基 於其投資人身份在與小股東間之代理問題較為輕微,而現金股利則可能成為家族企業利 益輸送之橋樑。另一方面,在不同之所有權結構具有政治連結後是否存在有調節效果上 之結果為部分顯著,顯示在中國市場中,國外法人與國內法人較易受到政治連結影響進 而改變其股利政策,而家族企業因為其自主性較其他所有權結構高,制定股利政策上較 不受到政治連結所影響。;We examine the effect of ownership structures and political connections on the payout policy. Our sample includes listed companies from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges for the year 2008 to 2014. We find that the foreign institutional investors, domestic institutional investors and family firms are prefer to pay more cash dividends, on the contrary, the state-owned enterprises are prefer to pay less cash dividends. We conclude that the foreign institutional investors and domestic institutional investors have more monitoring incentives to let firms disgorge cash, but dividends might be used by the family firms to engage in tunneling. We also find that different ownership structures with political connections will partially moderate their relationship to payout policy. It indicated that in China, foreign institutional investors and domestic institutional investors are apparently affected by political connections, but family firms are not. |
