薪酬索回條款對經理人獎酬之影響-以美國零售業公司為例;The effects of clawback provisions on executive’s compensations: A case study of US retail companies

NCUIR > School of Management at National Central University > Research institute of accounting > Electronic Thesis & Dissertation > Item 987654321/74588

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/74588

Title:	薪酬索回條款對經理人獎酬之影響-以美國零售業公司為例;The effects of clawback provisions on executive’s compensations: A case study of US retail companies
Authors:	羅慧君;Lo, Hui-Chun
Contributors:	會計研究所
Keywords:	經理人薪酬索回條款;紅利獎金;經理人薪酬;沙氏法案;多德-佛蘭克華爾街改革與消費者保護法;Clawback provisions;bonus;executive compensations;SOX 304;DFA 954
Date:	2017-07-06
Issue Date:	2017-10-27 14:19:21 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	國立中央大學
Abstract:	本研究以Abercrombie & Fitch (簡稱A&F), GAP, NIKE, SKECHERS, Steve Madden, Under Armour，作為本研究之樣本。本研究蒐集公司自願採用經理人薪酬索回條款之年度，以及各公司經理人各年度之薪酬、營收總額。而資料年度主要涵蓋2004年至2015年間。本研究發現公司自願採用經理人薪酬索回條款後，相較於自願採用前，經理人獲得的紅利獎金減少、紅利獎金佔總薪酬比重下降。本研究亦發現，公司在DFA 954頒布後，相較於DFA 954頒布前，不論先前有無自願採用經理人薪酬索回條款，經理人獲得的紅利獎金減少、紅利獎金佔總薪酬比重下降。 ;This study was conducted by companies such as A & F, GAP, NIKE, SKECHERS, Steve Madden, and Under Armor as a sample of this study. And this study collect the company voluntarily adopted the clawback provisions of the year, as well as the company′s annual executive’s compensations, total revenue in the company′s annual report and Proxy Statement. The above data mainly covers from 2004 to 2015 . This study found that the company voluntarily adopted the clawback provisions, bonus decrease, bonus to total compensations ratio decreased. This study also found that the company after DFA 954 released, bonus decrease, bonus to total compensations ratio decreased.
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