| 摘要: | 本研究在探討台灣1994到2012年的借殼公司在借殼當時的財務變數和公司治理情況與日後發生財務危機的關聯性，希望藉由研究結果讓投資人能提早避開地雷股的借殼公司。本文的變數資料取自台灣經濟新報(TEJ)，研究方法則是使用t檢定和羅吉斯迴歸。
本文t檢定是針對借殼前2年至後2年的變數做分析，結果顯示日後有發生財務危機的借殼公司，其資產報酬率、流動比率、董監質押和超額持股比率的平均數在借殼前兩年至借殼後兩年表現均較無發生過財務危機的借殼公司差，且資產報酬率在借殼前一年顯著，而流動比率和超額持股在各年皆顯著，董監質押則自借殼後一年開始顯著。稅後淨利率、應收帳款週轉次數和經理人持股的平均數則自借殼前一年開始表現較無發生過財務危機的借殼公司差，且稅後淨利率自借殼當年開始顯著，應收帳款週轉次數則自借殼後一年開始為顯著。總資產週轉次數的平均數則是除借殼當年外，其餘年度表現皆較無發生過財務危機的借殼公司差。董監持股的平均數除了借殼當年和借殼後兩年外，其餘年度表現皆較無發生過財務危機的借殼公司差，且在借殼前一年顯著。最大外部股東則是在借殼前一年和借殼當年表現較無發生過財務危機的借殼公司差。
實證結果的部分則發現借殼公司在借殼當年的經理人持股或超額持股比率越高時，日後借殼公司發生財務危機的機率較低。;This paper mainly examines the relationship between the financial distress and corporate governance variables index of Taiwan’s backdoor- listed companies from 1994 to 2012 on backdoor-listing year. We hope that the results will keep investors from the bad backdoor-listed companies earlier. The data on the variables in this paper derive from the TEJ; the t-test and the Logistic regression are used. In this paper, the t-test is from pre-listing year 2 to post-listing year 2.
In t-test, financial variables are also tested besides corporate governance variables index. The results show that the average ROA, current ratio, Board Pledged%, and Excess Control of the backdoor-listed companies are all poorer, and the average ROA is significant on pre-listing year 1, and the current ratio and the Excess Control are all significant, while the Board Pledged% had been significant since post-listing year 1; the average Net Income% , Accounts Receivables Turnover, and Managers’ Sharehold% had been poorer since pre-listing year 1, and the Net Income% is significant from backdoor-listing year to post-listing year 2, and the Accounts Receivables Turnover is significant on post-listing year 1 and post-listing year 2; the average Total Asset Turnover is poorer except on backdoor-listing year; the average Board% is poorer except on backdoor-listing year and post-listing year 2 and it is significant on pre-listing year 1; the average Shareholding ratio of the largest outside shareholder is poorer on pre-listing year 1 and backdoor-listing year than IPO companies.
In addition, the empirical results show that when Managers’ Sharehold% or Excess Control of the backdoor-listed companies on backdoor-listing year is high, the possibility of financial distress is significant low. |
