過往文獻多聚焦於新創企業如何取得外部資源，較少探討創辦人在引入外部股東、導致控制權下降之後，是否會出現試圖重新奪回控制權的行為反應。為了補足此研究缺口，本研究關注創辦人在面對在產生權力不平衡時，是否會採取防禦機制以維持其控制權，並進一步檢驗此反應是否呈現非線性的U型關係。本研究整合了資源依賴理論(Resource Dependence Theory, RDT)與控制困境(Control Dilemma)的觀點，提出防禦機制會隨權力不平衡程度呈現非線性變化，並引入創辦人特定人力資本(Specific Human Capital, SHC)作為調節因素，檢視其反應強度與時機的差異。 實證資料取自台灣創業小聚與經濟部商工登記資料庫，涵蓋 192 間新創公司及其歷次變更登記紀錄，共 968 筆觀察值，透過主成分分析(Principal Component Analysis, PCA)建構權力不平衡指標，以股權集中度衡量防禦機制，並運用固定效果模型進行分析。結果顯示，董事會權力不平衡與防禦機制之間存在顯著U型關係，且創辦人特定人力資本越高，曲線幅度越明顯。 本研究補足新創企業的研究文獻中，缺乏對創辦人回應控制權變動行為的研究，並突顯創辦人特質在新創企業中權力變化下的調節角色，亦可作為實務上創業團隊設計董事會與股權結構的重要參考。;While prior research on startups has emphasized resource acquisition, less attention has been paid to how founders respond behaviorally when external shareholders dilute their control. This study explores whether founders adopt defensive mechanisms to retain control in the face of board power imbalance, and whether such responses exhibit a nonlinear U-shaped pattern. Drawing on Resource Dependence Theory and the Control Dilemma framework, this study also examines how founder-specific human capital (SHC) moderates the strength and timing of these responses. Using data from 192 Taiwanese startups (968 firm-year observations) sourced from Taiwan Startup Stadium and official registration records, a power imbalance index is constructed via Principal Component Analysis (PCA), while equity concentration serves as a proxy for defensive behavior. Fixed-effects panel regressions reveal a significant U-shaped relationship between power imbalance and defensive mechanisms, with stronger effects among founders with higher SHC. This study enriches the entrepreneurial governance literature by highlighting founders’ strategic responses to shifts in control and the moderating role of founder characteristics. The findings also offer practical insights into board and equity structure design in startup teams.
