| 摘要: | 我國《公司法》於2015年增設「閉鎖性股份有限公司」制度，並允許其發行具高度彈性之特別股，立法目的在於回應中小企業及新創事業對資本運作與治理彈性的需求。然而，實務發展顯示，閉鎖性公司制度在運用上與立法期待存在落差，其主要應用反而多集中於家族企業的股權傳承與經營權鞏固。本論文即以特別股制度為切入點，透過經濟部公示登記資料進行實證分析，並輔以比較法觀察與理論檢討，以探究閉鎖性公司制
度是否真能達成其立法原初目的，並提出制度改革之可能方向。
本論文研究首先回顧我國閉鎖性公司與特別股制度之立法沿革，並釐清其與一般股份有限公司之差異。其次，以經濟部〈閉鎖性公司名錄〉及「商工登記公示資料」為基礎，分析閉鎖性公司設置特別股之實際情況。統計顯示，截至2024年11月，閉鎖性公司數量雖大幅成長，但設置特別股之比例並不高，且多集中於複數表決權與具否決權之類型，顯示企業運用重點仍在於維護創業者或特定股東之控制權，而與立法原意扶植新創產業之期待不盡相符。
進一步從比較法研究中發現，美國有限責任公司（LLC）與德國有限公司（GmbH）制度，皆透過高度契約自治或簡化治理架構，成功兼顧資本彈性與人合特質，並提供中小企業更適切之選項。相較之下，我國閉鎖性公司雖引進類似概念，卻受制於法律限制及章程自治空間不足，導致制度競爭力有限。
歸納實證與比較法分析結果，本論文認為我國閉鎖性公司與特別股制度尚未充分發揮其功能。未來應透過放寬章程自治範圍、簡化程序性規範，並參酌LLC與GmbH經驗，以建構更能契合多元企業需求之公司型態。如此方能真正實現立法目的，並提升臺灣公司法制之競爭力與吸引力。;In 2015, Taiwan’s Company Act introduced the regime of the “Close Company” and permitted the issuance of highly flexible preferred shares, with the legislative intent of addressing the capital structure and governance needs of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and start-ups. Nevertheless, practical developments reveal a discrepancy between legislative expectations and actual utilization: the close company has been predominantly applied in family-owned businesses to preserve succession and consolidate control, rather than fostering innovation as originally envisioned. This study adopts the preferred share regime as its analytical entry point, conducting an empirical analysis of publicly available registration data released by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, supplemented with comparative legal perspectives and theoretical evaluation, to assess whether the close company has achieved its legislative purposes and to explore potential directions for reform.
The research first traces the legislative evolution of Taiwan’s close company and preferred share regimes, clarifying their distinctions from the conventional corporation. It then examines the extent to which close companies have adopted preferred shares by drawing upon the Close Company Register and the public database of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The empirical findings indicate that although the number of close companies has grown significantly by 2024, the proportion utilizing preferred shares remains limited, with concentration in multiple-voting and veto-right shares. This trend suggests that enterprises primarily employ the mechanism to secure founders’ or controlling shareholders’ interests, which diverges from the legislative goal of supporting start-ups.
From a comparative law perspective, the study highlights how the U.S. Limited Liability Company (LLC) and the German Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH) achieve an effective balance between capital flexibility and personalist characteristics through contractual autonomy and simplified governance structures, thereby providing SMEs with more suitable organizational choices. In contrast, Taiwan’s close company, though modeled on similar concepts, remains constrained by legal limitations and insufficient scope for charter autonomy, ultimately reducing its institutional competitiveness.
Synthesizing the empirical evidence and comparative insights, this study argues that Taiwan’s close company and preferred share regimes have yet to realize their intended functions. Future reforms should focus on expanding contractual autonomy, simplifying procedural requirements, and drawing lessons from the LLC and GmbH models to develop a more adaptable corporate form for diverse business needs. Only through such reforms can the legislative objectives be meaningfully achieved and Taiwan’s corporate law framework be strengthened in terms of both competitiveness and attractiveness. |
