本文欲檢視我國金管會於民國95年修正年報董監事得分人分項揭露薪酬的規定，改為依薪資級距公告後，調查國內上市公司後發現總經理替換率-績效敏感度較修正公告前小。其中非家族企業下降比較家族企業雇用外部總經理者多、家族企業中家族成員擔任總經理之企業下降比也較家族雇用外部總經理者多。本研究提供證據顯示法律對於薪酬揭露的管制越嚴格，總經理的表現越能與公司績效相連結。 In 2006, the Financial Supervisory Commission amended articles of “Regulations Governing Information to be Published in Annual Reports of Public Companies”. It reduced the quality of mandated compensation disclosure. This study investigates the impact of mandated compensation disclosure on firms' CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. We find that CEO turnover-performance sensitivity become less than before, with the poor quality of mandated disclosure. Moreover, we also examine how the decrease of CEO turnover-performance sen-sitivity varies across three types of firms – family CEO firms, professional CEO family firms, and non-family firms. The empirical findings are consistent with the decrease of CEO turno-ver-performance sensitivity is lower for family CEO firms and non-family firms than for pro-fessional CEO family firms, with the poor quality of mandated disclosure.
