近年來的節約能源話題帶來的影響就是讓企業可思考更多關於環保，由於這個議題越來越被重視，而電子垃圾的處理以及回收也亦趨重要。也因為回收再製產品會具有高營利，並且引起所多環境效應，包括減少能源消耗跟減少廢棄物。 本篇研究是延伸Ferre rand Swaminathan（2006）製造商為壟斷者及在競爭市場中有競爭者存在的多期回收模式。研究單一製造商，在第一期間去生產新產品，並在之後期間使用回收機制方式以提供再製品及新產品去滿足顧客的需求。本文研究是如何決定產品回收次數，使製造商可得利潤最佳化。判定產品回收次數，是將每期再製造節省成本門檻值與再製造節省成本作於比較，再決定再製造的回收次數。再製造節省成本門檻值代表製造商採用回收機制是否有利潤。下一步，重點將把注意力集中在雙寡頭壟斷的環境下，競爭者可攔截製造商的產品做回收再製造銷售，探討兩者在市場下競爭關係。當發現再製造產品是非常有利可圖，製造商可能會放棄在第一期銷售價格，進行降低價格來增加銷售數量，以備在未來期間可回收製成再製品數量眾多。在競爭加劇的威脅中，製造商更可能完全利用所有可用回收產品，在市場上提供較低的再製造產品價格。We interest a firm that makes new products in the first period and uses returned cores to offer remanufactured products and new products in future periods. We use the number of remanufactured cycling products as thresholds. We introduce the monopoly environment in multi period scenarios to identify thresholds in remanufacturing operations. Next, we focus on the duopoly environment. An independent operator might intercept cores of products made by the original equipment manufacturer to sell remanufactured products in future periods. We describe the production quantities associated with self-selection and research the effect of various parameters in the Nash equilibrium. In the results, we find that if remanufacturing is very benefit, the original-equipment manufacturer might give up some of the first-period margin by lowering the price. And that, they selling additional units to raise the number of cores available for remanufacturing in future periods. In the further, when the threat of competition rises, the manufacturer is approximately to completely use all available cores and offering the remanufactured products at a lower price.
