隨著時代的變遷，人類對於自然資源的需求增加，使得全球原物料的縮減，過度的消耗下造成地球資源的枯竭，資源回收已成為全球的風潮。台灣資源回收制度是藉由一方面對生產廠商課徵回收清除處理費，另一方面對回收處理業者進行補貼以增加回收量的兩階段政策工具(Two-part Instrument)。本研究欲探討政府透過基管會的運作介入產業供應鏈，以使得整個供應鏈的運作達到最佳效率，政府會同時考量環境政策與企業策略之間互動的過程，在追求社會福利最大化與企業追求利潤最大化間，制定出一個最適的決策。本研究將建構一個政府透過兩階段政策工具的經濟誘因工具來制定出最適的回收處理清除費率及回收處理補貼費率的經濟模型。研究方法將根據賽局理論的假設，將政府與製造商和處理商，以及製造商與零售商，處理商與回收商的互動關係，來建立一個三階段的賽局(Three-stage game)。本研究目的在於透過此模型的建構，找出正逆向供應鏈中各角色的生產及定價決策，及政府透過基管會的運作下，找出社會福利及供應鏈的整體利潤，並探討正向供應鏈(製造業─零售業)與逆向供應鏈(處理業─回收業)在受到政府兩階段政策工具上產生的影響為何。When the time goes by, the demand of nature resource is increasing, so the volume of material is decreasing. The over consuming of material is the alarm to human. To solve this problem, resource recycling has become a global wave. The recycling policy in Taiwan is "Two-part Instrument". One of the part is taxing Advanced Recycling Fees (ARF) on the manufacturers, and the other part is offering subsidy fees for processors. The thesis is discussed about Environmental Protection Administration(EPA), an institute of government, which will influence the industry supply chain. In order to maximize social welfare, the EPA determines the ARFs paid by manufacturers and the subsidy fees for processors when retailer sells new products and processor process regulated recyclable waste.The thesis will construct a three-stage game model to find out optimal economic policy. The leader in the first stage is EPA, the followers are manufacturer and processor ; the leaders in the second stage are manufacturer and processor, and the followers are retailer and recycler . The members in a green supply chain all decide the best price to maximize the profit. Moreover, we will find out the difference between forward supply chain(EPA-Manufacturer-Retailer) and reverse supply chain(EPA-Processor-Recycler) based on the issue discussed in this thesis.
