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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/63664


    Title: 連鎖企業經營方式之經濟分析-直營或加盟的選擇;Business operation economic analysis of chain enterprise modes - straight or franchising choice
    Authors: 陳志敏;CHEN,CHIH-MIN
    Contributors: 產業經濟研究所碩士在職專班
    Keywords: 不削價競爭;對稱市場;symmetric markets;undercut-proof equilibrium
    Date: 2009-01-21
    Issue Date: 2014-05-08 15:15:25 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 國立中央大學
    Abstract: 國內商品零售市場已邁入成熟期,商品市場品牌擁有者為拓展銷售通路,及市場佔有力,大多使用於連鎖加盟經營模式,且品牌擁有者為奪取市場採取削價競爭策略,雖然產量增加但價格降低,利潤並不比降價之前佳,故品牌擁有者在面對不同市場結構,應採取何種經營模式及價格策略,使得總利潤極大。
    本文探討商品市場品牌擁有者在獨佔市場,面對兩個分隔的區域以直營店、加盟店、或者同時使用這兩種策略討論品牌擁有者追求總利潤極大化下,應選擇何種方式經營,並且於兩區域分別技術授權投資者開兩家加盟店,形成品牌內價格競爭時,利用undercut-proof equilibrium理論及以兩階段賽局以分析品牌內價格競爭時最適經營模式及最大利潤。賽局程序如下所示:第一階段:兩家品牌加盟店同時且獨立設定價格,以追求利潤最大。第二階段:消費者在觀察兩加盟店之價格後選擇購買。由於本文討論完全資訊下有限階段賽局因此以子賽局完全均衡(subgame perfect equilibrium)作為賽局均衡並以回溯法(backward induction)求解均衡。並且利用undercut-proof equilibrium理論,探討在此均衡下兩家品牌加盟店能極大化利潤,同時又不致於因訂價過高,而使對手有誘因採取削價競爭策略之價格訂定。研究結果如下:
      1.對一個獨佔的連鎖商店品牌擁有者而言,選擇僅成立一家商店,則加盟店經營方式優於直營店經營
      2. 品牌獨占廠商在消費者對稱分佈情形下,於兩區域分別技術授權投資者開兩家加盟店,訂定價格為消費者付出交通成本兩倍
      3. 於不同經營方式比較之下,品牌獨佔廠商於兩區域分別成立二家加盟店經營方式較優
    ;This article discusses the brand owner in the commodity market to monopolize the market, facing two separation's regions by the straight store, the franchising store, or simultaneously uses these two kind of strategy discussion brand owner to pursue under the gross profit maximization, should choose what way management, And is authorized the investor in two region distinction technology to open two tfranchising the store, when forms in the brand the price competition, using undercut-proof the equilibrium theory and analyzes in the brand by the game consists of two stage match bureau when the price competition the most suitable business model and the biggest profit.
    The game procedure as follows shows: The first stage: At the same time two franchising brand store establishe the price independently,. The second stage: The consumer is purchasing selection of observing price . And using undercut-proof the equilibrium theory, discusses in this balanced two brand franchising store can maximization the profit, simultaneously does not have the cause to adopt cuting prices to the strategy of the competing price.
    The findings are as follows:
    1.To monopoly Chain store brand owner, the choice only establishes a franchising store, then the straight store .
    2. The brand monopolized manufacturer under the consumer symmetrical distributed situation, open two franchising store in two region distinction, schedules the price to pay transportation cost two times for the consumer
    3. under the different modes of business operation, The modes of business operation are superior that the brand monopolized manufacturer to establish two franchising store separately in two regions.
    Appears in Collections:[產業經濟研究所碩士在職專班 ] 博碩士論文

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