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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/67414


    Title: 複門號現象與行動電信廠商的訂價決策
    Authors: 余聖理;Yu,Sheng-Li
    Contributors: 經濟學系
    Keywords: 接續費;經濟;電信;產業;二部訂價;差別訂價;網路;access fee;economic;telecommunication;industry;two-part tariffs;Price Discrimination;network
    Date: 2015-03-26
    Issue Date: 2015-05-08 15:34:55 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 國立中央大學
    Abstract: 我們依據既有電信產業文獻假設,設計一個成本對稱的廠商採取二部訂價法以及網
    內外差別訂價法的行動電信市場模型,並設定行動電信廠商間的價格競爭為一個兩階段賽局,廠商將於賽局第一階段會共同協定統一的接續費水準(但若當局對接續費採行管制則廠商僅於第二階段競爭),第二階段則分別對網內通話價與網外通話價差別訂價,最終消費者再依據廠商間的訂價決策來決定消費者均衡。

    其次,我們再額外考慮網內價格效益與門號數量效益,令消費者的門號數量決策內
    生化來放寬既有文獻的單門號訂閱假設,使之更符合台灣實務。藉由修改霍特林的空間競爭模型的方式,令複門號現象得以分析;我們將新發展的模型稱之為複門號模型。
    藉由複門號模型進行電信市場結構分析後 我們主要得出以下三個結論:

    首先,當門號提供成本f 愈低、總邊際成本c 愈低,網內相對淨效用水準r = v/τ 愈高且接續成本加成比率m 愈高時,行動電信市場將會出現複門號現象且隨之加重;但若複門號現象不存在,則行動電信市場應改採既有文獻中的單門號模型設定進行分析。

    其次,目前我國接續費水準受到NCC 所管制,倘若NCC 完全放棄對接續費的管制
    任由市場決定,則成本對稱、資費採取二部訂價與網內外差別訂價的廠商,在自由競爭下將於賽局第一階段統一協定一個等同邊際接續成本的接續費水準 ǎπ = c0 (亦即m =0),此時網內價等於網外價並且等於總邊際成本c,廠商完全依靠月租費獲利;且複門號現象絕不會發生。

    最後,基於社會福利的觀點,除非在門號提供成本f 很低且網內相對淨效用水準
    r=v(c | η)/τ很高的特殊市場結構下,NCC 透過管制調高接續費至某一水準以上甚至完全禁止跨網通話(m→∞)因此促進複門號現象,才有辦法改善社會福利;否則一般來說,正如同既有文獻主張,NCC 應當調降接續費至邊際接續成本水準(a = c0)導致複門號現象消失,來達到社會福利極大化(本文中另證明在此情況下,當局放棄對接續費的管制亦能達到同樣政策效果)。

    儘管如此,在面對某些市場結構下既有文獻的福利分析將產生嚴重偏誤這一點,仍是我們研究的新發現。;According to our assumption that both the telecom industry literature, symmetrical design cost manufacturers to take a non-linear pricing method and network operations inside and
    outside the difference in pricing law telecommunications market model, and set the price competition among manufacturers of telecommunications operations for a two-stage game, Board game makers will be the first phase of a common agreement uniform standard access fee (but if regulatory authorities to adopt the butt renewals manufacturers compete only in the second stage), the second phase of the network were to call the call price and the external network price difference between pricing, pricing decisions based on the final consumer and then to decide between vendors consumer equilibrium.

    Secondly, let us consider the extra price within the network efficiency and effectiveness of the number of Multi-cellphone, so that the number of decisions in the Multi-cellphone of consumers to relax both biochemical literature single-cellphone of Subscribe assumptions to make it more in line with practice in Taiwan. By modifying Hotelling spatial competition model the way in which to analyze the Multi-cellphone phenomenon; model we will develop new model called the Multi-cellphone model.

    By Multi-cellphone phenomenon after the telecommunications market structure model analysis we draw the following three main conclusions:

    First, when the door to provide cost f the lower number, the lower the total marginal cost c, the relative net utility network level r = v / τ higher and higher when the cost-plus rate m follow, action telecommunications market will be re-door No phenomenon and subsequently increase; but if Multi-cellphone does not exist, the action should shift to the telecommunications market in the literature both single-cellphone model number set for analysis.

    Second, the current level of connection fees are regulated by the NCC, NCC completely abandoned if the docking control renewals let the market decide, the cost of symmetry, pricing and tariffs take nonlinear pricing difference between internal and external network vendors, under free competition will The first phase innings in a unified agreement connection fee equivalent to the standard marginal costs follow ǎπ = c0 (ie m = 0), this time in the net-net price equal to marginal cost equals the total price and c, manufacturers rely entirely on monthly fee profit; and Multi-cellphone phenomenon will never happen.

    Finally, based on the viewpoint of social welfare, unless the cost of f at door number is relatively low and the network net utility level r = v (c | η) / τ under high specific market structure, NCC through regulatory access fees continue to increase above a certain level even if a complete ban on cross Netcom (m → ∞) thus facilitating Multi-cellphone phenomenon,only way to improve social welfare; otherwise, in general, just as the existing literature advocates, NCC should continue to cut costs to marginal access cost level (a = c0) leads to double door number disappears, to achieve social welfare maximization (another article to prove in this case, the authorities can also give up control of the docking renewals policy to achieve the same effect). Nevertheless, in the face of certain market structure analysis under both the welfare literature would have serious bias that is still new finding of our study.
    Appears in Collections:[經濟研究所 ] 博碩士論文

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