本文運用台灣上市櫃電子業公司的數據，研究公司治理、企業創新與經營績效三者之間的關係。文中利用網絡差額變數模型（Network slack-based model, SBM）估計企業創新活動的效率，並將其分為研發與行銷兩個子階段。實證結果發現，行銷效率對於經營績效有積極的影響，並且中介了「機構法人持股與資產報酬率」以及「經理人持股與Tobin′s Q 」之間的關係。法人持股與行銷效率以及資產報酬率皆存在正向關係，代表法人持股會透過促進行銷效率，對公司財務績效有更進一步的正面影響。另一方面，經理人持股與 Tobin′s Q 存在負向關係，而與行銷效率則存在正向關係，經理人持股也會透過行銷效率的渠道對公司價值有積極的影響，略微減緩因管理者持股比例過高所產生的代理問題。 另外，本文也驗證了股權結構與經營績效之間的非線性關係：大股東持股與Tobin’s Q 存在「倒Ｕ型曲線」關係，代表大股東持股比例愈高，經營績效愈好，但在超過一半（約為52.63%）的股權集中於少數股東手中時，反而不利於公司的市場價值。經理人持股與 ROA 則存在「Ｕ型曲線」關係，當經理人持有更多股權時，對於經營績效有消極的影響，然而當其持股率高達約為 31.27% 以上時，反而會轉為正面的影響。 ;This paper investigates the relationship among corporate governance, firm innovation, and firm performance using data from Taiwanese listed electronics companies. The firm-level innovation efficiency is estimated by the network slack-based model (SBM) and divided into two sub-stages: R&D and marketing. The results show that marketing efficiency has a positive effect on firm performance and mediates the relationship between institutional ownership and ROA as well as managers’ ownership and Tobin′s Q. There is a positive correlation between institutional ownership and marketing efficiency as well as ROA, which means that institutional ownership has a further positive impact on financial performance by promoting marketing efficiency. On the other hand, managers’ ownership has a negative impact on Tobin′s Q while a positive impact on marketing efficiency. Managers’ ownership also has a positive impact on firm value through the channel of marketing efficiency and slightly mitigates the agency problems. Apart from this, this paper also verifies the non-linear relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. First, there is an "inverted U-shaped" curve relationship between large shareholders’ ownership and Tobin′s Q, which means that the higher percentage of large shareholders’ ownership will have better performance. However, when more than half (52.63%) of the shareholding is concentrated in the hands of minority shareholders, it is detrimental to the firm value. Second, there is a "U-shaped" curve relationship between managers’ ownership and ROA. When managers hold more shares, it has a negative impact on the firm performance. However, when their shareholding is above 31.27%, the impact has turned positive.
