台灣半導體未上市公司股權評價之個案研究：以A公司為例

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Title:	台灣半導體未上市公司股權評價之個案研究：以A公司為例
Authors:	呂淨君;Lu, Ching Chung
Contributors:	財務金融學系在職專班
Keywords:	股權評價;現金流量折現法;市場法;控制權溢價;缺乏市場流動性折價;資本資產定價模型;Business valuation;Free cash flow discount approach;Market method;Control premium;Discount for lack of marketability;Capital Asset Pricing Model
Date:	2024-06-21
Issue Date:	2024-10-09 16:20:32 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	國立中央大學
Abstract:	良好的股權評價品質是企業併購過程中不可或缺的重要環節。由於國內研究，常見僅採一種現金流量折現法評估企業價值，不符合評價準則規定須至少採用兩種評價方法，因而可能造成評價結果偏頗失準；或雖採用現金流量折現法及市場法兩種方法評價，然兩種方法之間缺乏「控制權溢價」及「市場流動性折價」的合理分析調節，無法反映真實的企業價值。為降低前段所述僅採一種評價方法可能造成評價結果偏頗失準的風險，本研究個案採用兩種評價方法。基於個案已經營多年且獲利穩定，合理預估未來的現金流量，並以適當反映風險之折現率折現，應能合理反映公司價值；故本個案將採現金流量折現法，評估股權價值。另考量半導體產業在台灣已形成聚落，上市類比公司資料可從公開資訊取得，本個案同時也以市場法評估其結果。本文主要研究台灣未上市半導體設備代理商A公司被半導體設備上市公司收購個案的股權評價，並進一步評估選擇最能彰顯A公司股權價值的「控制權溢價」及「缺乏市場流動性折減」方法調整折溢價，透過調節兩種評價方法來估算A公司的合理股權價值。首先，有關控制權溢價調整，因A公司係出售超過50%以上股權，因此必須調整控制權溢價，參考國際研究機構Mergerstat®/BVR最新統計數據，對A公司歸屬的標準產業分類(standard Industrial Classification, SIC)代碼3559設備產業的控制權溢價中位數22.5%調整股權價值。再者，個案亦需要調整缺乏市場流通性折價。衡量具控制權股權的缺乏市場流動性折價，可考量其獲得流動性的成本，即假設A公司公開上市時所需的發行成本；其中最主要變動成本為承銷商費用，公司規模愈小則發行費用的佔比愈大。本研究參考Pratt (2009)，承銷商對小型公司的預期費用為15%，因而本案取15%作為具控制權的缺乏市場流動性折價調整。綜上所述，考量具控制權及缺乏流通性風險折價調整下，以收益法之現金流量現法及市場法之可類比公司法，估計A公司合理之每股價值介於104.83元及 114.89元之間。 ;Firms conducting mergers and acquisitions (M&As) require fair and unbiased evalua-tion on the equity value of target firms. However, a common drawback of extant re-search in Taiwan is only employing the discounted cash flow (DCF) method for the evaluation, as opposed to the practical standards which require the use of at least two methods so as to minimize impacts from possible biases and mistakes. Moreover, alt-hough some recent literature does employ both DCF and the market methods for evalu-ation, they fail to consider two important aspects, i.e., large shareholders of the target firm may require a control premium, and shares of private target firm lack liquidity of transaction. In contrast, this study will focus on these two aspects so as to conclude a fair and unbiased equity value of the target firm. This study will employ both DCF and the market methods for evaluation of a specific target firm, Firm A. I first use the DCF method for evaluation since Firm A has operated in the semiconductor industry for considerable time with stable profits. Therefore, its value can be derived based on reasonable predictions on future cash flows, while dis-counting them with a rate which incorporates the risk profile of the company. I then use the market method for valuing Firm A since the semiconductor industry in Taiwan is mature enough that I am certain with the position of Firm A in the product stream of the industry, and the information of comparable companies is available to be obtained from public dataset. In details, I intend to investigate the value of the target Firm A, an unlisted semiconduc-tor equipment agent company, from the perspective of the acquirer, a publicly listed semiconductor equipment company. After employing both DCF and the market meth-ods for evaluation, I further add the optimal "control premium" for large shareholders of Firm A, and then deduct “discount for lack of marketability" (DLOM) from share value of Firm A. I then conclude by integrating results from both methods and form a final suggestion for the share value of Firm A. The rationales for further adjustments are as follows. First, as Firm A plans to sell more than 50% of its equity shares to the acquirer, I need to add the "control premium" to the unadjusted results from two evaluation methods. According to most recent statistics provided by Mergerstat®/BVR Study, the value of Firm A should include the median control premium of 22.5% in the “equipment industry” (with Standard Industrial Classi-fication, SIC code 3559). In addition, I deduct DLOM from the value of Firm A since it is unlisted and thus lack-ing the transaction liquidity in the market. A reasonable proxy for DLOM is the under-writer′s fees assuming Firm A conducts Initial Public Offerings (IPO). Therefore, I em-ploy Pratt (2009)’s estimate for the underwriter′s expected fee for small companies to be 15%. After taking both the control premium and DLOM into account, I suggest that the per share value for Firm A should be in the range between TWD104.83 and TWD114.89.
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