台灣有許多家族企業，積極的創業精神與強烈的家族向心力是家族企業的關鍵成功因素，然而家族主義的許多特質也可能導致異於一般非家族企業的獨特公司治理環境，本研究於是藉由觀察總經理異動與公司治理變數之間的關聯性，檢定公司治理的效能。為觀察總經理異動行為藉以檢視公司治理之效能，本研究取樣台灣上市公司共計304家，其中包括63家家族控制公司，241家非家族控制公司。實證結果顯示：家族控制公司總經理異動顯著比非家族控制公司低。此外，家族控制公司總經理異動與公司績效呈現顯著負相關。然而，總經理所有權與董事會所有權則與家族企業總經理任期無關。此項發現隱含家族企業董事會足以有效置換總經理，即使所有權相對較低。因此，從所有權結構觀點，本研究建議代理理論適用於解釋台灣非家族控制公司的總經理異動行為，然而，並不適用於解釋台灣家族控制公司的總經理異動行為。 Many businesses are family-controlled in Taiwan. The aggressive nature of entrepreneurship and strong cohesiveness of families are successful factors. Many aspects of familism also lead to the unique corporate governance in family businesses. This study tested the effectiveness of corporate governance by investigating the link between CEO turnover and corporate governance of family and nonfamily firms in Taiwan. This study investigated the tenure of CEOs in a sample of 304 listed companies in Taiwan; 63 firms were family controlled and 241 were not. The results show that CEO turnover is significantly lower in family firms and its relationship to corporate performance is negative. CEO ownership and board ownership are not significant in explaining the length of family CEO tenure. These findings imply that family boards can still effectively replace the CEO despite relatively low ownership. From the ownership structure perspective, this study suggested that the agency theory is applicable for nonfamily firms in Taiwan, but unsuitable for family firms.
