本研究以庫藏股法開始實施至2005年12月31日止實施庫藏股之上市（櫃）公司為基礎樣本，再進一步蒐集各公司在庫藏股宣告前發行公司債者深入分析，使庫藏股制度對公司價值的影響，能在結合債券下提供不同的看法。透過投資不足的問題，實證探討公司可能藉由股票購回以剝削債權人財富。實證結果發現在控制時間與產業效果後，相較於未舉債融資者，公司以舉債融資方式進行股票購回者市場會給予較低的市場反應。與訊號假說、自由現金流量假說相左，實證結果支持財富剝削假說，我們發現股票購回前發行公司債的公司後續伴隨資本支出與營運績效的降低，且控制股東會降低其持股。且此類型的公司未來其系統風險與現金準備率會明顯地提高。最後，實證發現庫藏股宣告效果與未來績效、自由現金流量、內部人士持股具有正向關係，並與系統風險及負債比率具有負向關係。 This paper empirically examines the underinvestment problem and the use of repurchase to expropriate lenders’ wealth. This paper find that, after controlling for timing and industry effects, the repurchasing firm with debt financing has a much smaller stock price response than those without debt financing. Contrary to the implications of many payout theories, the announcements of share repurchases with previous debt issues are followed by reductions in investments, in operating performance, and in insider holdings. Results also indicate that firms with debt financing experience a significant increase in systematic risk relative to those without. Finally, evidences indicate that the short-term market reactions are positively associated with future changes in profitability and free cash flows, and negatively associated with future changes in risk, insider net selling activities and debt ratios.
