Holderness (1990) 認為，就公開上市公司而言，「董監事暨重要職員責任保險」(Director’ and Officers’ (D&O) liability insurance)在公司治理上扮演一個重要的角色。O’Sullivan (1997) 則就Holderness的假說做實證，其結果大致支持Holderness 的監督(Monitoring)假說。本論文則就2004年國內619家上市上櫃電子公司為樣本，藉檢視存在於「董事會組成」(board composition)、「管理人股權」(managerial ownership)與「外部股東控制」(external shareholder control)之相關性，以探求董監事暨重要職員責任保險在公司治理上所扮演的角色。 儘管本文實證結果僅部分支持前述監督假說，然本研究不僅可視為國內首開研究D&O責任保險的公司治理角色之議題，本研究結果也提供進一步深入探討台灣上市上櫃電子業對D&O責任保險的需求。 Holderness (1990) suggests that director’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance has an important governance role in publicly owned companies. O’Sullivan (1997) empirically tests Holderness’s monitoring hypothesis, the results generally support the monitoring hypothesis. By examining the association between board composition, managerial ownership, external shareholder control, and the purchase of D&O insurance, this paper examines the role of Directors’ and Officers’ liability insurance in corporate governance of 619 TSE-Listed and Over-the-Counter Listed (OTC-Listed) electronic companies in Taiwan. Although the results merely partly support the monitoring hypothesis, this study not only can be considered an important first step in attempting to understand the governance role of D&O insurance but also provide some further insights on the demand for D&O insurance in Taiwan.
