本文主要探討國內上市公司之財務限制、股權結構、董事會特性以及經理人過度自信等對投資支出與公司內部現金流量間敏感度之影響,研究期間為1999至2004,共有437間上市公司、2622個觀察值,資料型態為縱橫資料(panel data)。本文參考Bond和Meghir(1994)所提出之動態投資模型,並以GMM進行模型之估計,所得之實證結果分別為:隨機構投資人持股率、董事會規模、外部董事比例的增加,或公司之董事長兼任總經理,會顯著地降低公司投資支出對內部現金流量之依賴;公司面臨財務限制、較高的內部人持股率或經理人具有過度自信之特質,皆會顯著地增強公司投資支出與內部現金流量之敏感度;而大股東持股率則沒有足夠證據顯示,其對投資與現金流量間敏感度有顯著的影響。 This paper examines the effect of financial constraints, ownership structure, characteristics of board of directors, and CEO overconfidence on the sensitivities of cash flows to investment. The sample period is from 1999 to 2004, and the sample consists of 2622 observations for 437 companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE). The Panel data analysis and Bond and Meghir (1994) dynamic investment models are estimated by Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) in this study. The empirical evidence shows that firstly as the level of institutional ownership, the size of board of directors, and the level of external directors increase or the chairman is also the CEO, the sensitivities of cash flows to investment significantly decrease. Then, companies facing financial constraints, higher insider ownership levels, and CEO overconfidence have significantly higher sensitivity of cash flows to investment. Finally, there is little evidence showing that the level of blockholder ownership has a significant impact on the sensitivity of cash flows to investment.