本研究旨在探討公司所有權結構，是否會影響公司進行產品多角化與國際化策略，以及其對產品多角化與國際化產生之公司績效的影響。本文承襲La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer（1999），以控制權與現金流量權的偏離程度，作為控制股東掠奪少數股權股東之替代變數。研究結果發現：控制股東的控制權偏離現金流量權程度越大時，公司進行產品多角化活動越多，進行國際化的活動越少。此外，研究結果亦發現，企業在經營產品多角化與國際化策略時，當控制股東的股權偏離情況越低時，其經營成果越好。 This paper examines the impact of the corporate ownership structure on product diversification and international behavior, and the effect of product and international diversification on firm value. Following La Porta , Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), we measure the magnitude of agency problem with the deviation of controlling shareholder’s voting rights from cash flow rights. We find that product diversification is significantly and positive related to the degree of the agency problem. Secondly, when the degree of this deviation is increasing, the international behavior is significantly and negatively related. Furthermore, we also find results suggesting that when the degree of this deviation is decreasing, the firm value of product and international diversification is better.
