相對於非家族企業，家族企業面對較不嚴重的所有權和管理權分離之代理問題，然而面對較嚴重的大小股東間之代理問題。針對台灣上市櫃公司進行研究發現，家族企業對自願性盈餘預測意願較低、發布盈餘預測次數較少，且發布的盈餘品質較好，此和家族企業通常有較長遠的投資、管理監督較好及與經理人間的資訊不對稱程度較低所導致的結果一致。進一步就家族擔任高管理階層人員而言，其實證結果相同。 Compared to non-family firms, family firms face less severe agency problems due to the separation of ownership and management, but more severe agency problems between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. We collected data from listed and over the counter firms, and show that family firms provide less voluntary disclosure, forecast less frequently, report better quality earnings. The result is consistent with family owners having longer investment horizon, better monitoring of management, and lower information asymmetry between owners and managers. Using alternative proxies for family presence (family members being CEO) leads to similar results.
