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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/12085


    Title: 從代理理論觀點探討家族企業之股票買回行為;Agency Theory and The Repurchase Behaviors of Family Business
    Authors: 許凱婷;Kai-Ting Hsu
    Contributors: 企業管理研究所
    Keywords: 家族企業;股票買回;代理理論;Agency theory;Repurchase;Family business
    Date: 2008-06-20
    Issue Date: 2009-09-22 14:39:09 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 國立中央大學圖書館
    Abstract: 本研究以2001至2006年間台灣上市、上櫃公司為樣本,探討家族企業特性、家族成員隸屬以及外部治理機制對企業之股票買回政策之影響。本研究加入家族因素,探討家族企業在控制權與所有權分離的情況下,其股票買回的可能性,利用邏輯迴歸(Logit regression )分析方法;結果發現,家族企業越不會進行股票買回,偏離程度與股票買回呈現倒U型關係,當存在家族CEO時,企業經營者會利用股票買回政策可改變股權結構的特性,增加手中之持股權;另外當企業存在家族CEO且偏離程度越高時,越不會進行股票買回;當企業之董事長兼任CEO時,亦會利用股票買回政策增加對企業之控制權,並且直到偏離程度高達可以足夠掌控經營決策時,會降低股票買回政策的執行。在外部治理機制方面,家族企業之外部董事能發揮監督公司之效,而非家族企業則相反;企業與第二大股東則可能存在利益關係,尤其是非家族企業;機構投資人於家族企業中無法發揮監督之效。 Our research sample contains Taiwanese listed and OTC firms from 2001 to 2006. The purpose of this research is to investigate how the characteristics of family business and corporate governance mechanism influence the repurchase policy of a firm. Using the Logit regression model, the results are as follows: 1. Family business has negative relationship with repurchase. 2. Divergence has inverted U shape relationship with repurchase. 3. Family CEO is positively related to repurchase. However, when considering divergence, the result turns to negative. 4. Enterprise leader serving as chairman and CEO is positively associated with repurchase. However, the result turns to negative when considering divergence. 5. Outside directors in family businesses have better monitoring with more repurchase. 6. Second largest shareholders could cooperate with controlling business to benefit themselves. 7. institutional investors would push a business to increase repurchase.
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute of Business Administration] Electronic Thesis & Dissertation

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