本研究旨在探討家族特性對公司盈餘管理行為的影響；同時也探討公司治理機制的效果是否因家族特性而有所差異。實證結果顯示，盈餘管理行為受到公司是否為家族控制企業的影響很大。家族企業相對於非家族企業，盈餘管理的可能性較低，反應的是管家理論精神的發揮。當公司屬於家族企業，關係人交易的動機乃有效率地滿足公司的經濟需要，因而降低盈餘管理的可能性；外部董事任期越長，反應的是董事專業假說，因而抑制盈餘管理之行為。但如果公司屬於非家族企業，則本研究發現，盈餘管理的可能性會隨負債比率的增加而更明顯；但會隨外部董事有經歷比率的提高而降低。此外，本研究更進一步發現機構法人的監督效果，會因公司資訊透明度的不同而有所差異。本研究結果可協助釐清家族特性、公司治理和盈餘管理間之關係。 The purpose of this study is to investigate how attributes of family business affect earnings management behavior and whether the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management behavior have significant differences due to attributes of family business. The empirical results indicate that earnings management behavior is greatly affected by whether the firm is family-controlled or not. Compared with non-family business, the possibility of earnings management for family business is lower, which brings the spirit of stewardship theory into full play. The results also show that when the firm is family-controlled, related party transactions efficiently fulfill underlying economic needs of the firm and then lower the possibility of earnings management; if the firm is family controlled, the tenure of outside directors will restrain earnings management behavior, which supports the expertise hypothesis; non-family firms engage in more earnings management as the ratio of financial leverage increases, but engage in less earnings management as the ratio of outside director experience increases. In addition, this study finds that the monitoring effect of institutional investors is affected by information transparency. The results of this study help us better understand the relationship among attributes of family business, corporate governance and earnings management.
