過去研究多著重於探討員工股票獎酬對員工生產力的影響，但員工股票獎酬實為公司人力資源管理政策上重要的策略措施，因此探討運用員工股票獎酬的效益時，不應僅注重與生產效率相關之生產力效果，也同時應注重此一措施對財務績效的影響。特別是若由股東價值的角度切入，其對公司市場績效的影響也應一併考量。而本研究也認為員工股票獎酬對不同績效指標的影響並不一致。而本研究將運用跨公司跨時間之長期性資料，用以檢視員工股票獎酬的財務績效效果。希望能夠處理在人力資源管理活動研究時常見之因果無法判定之問題。同時由於探討公司治理與勞僱關係兩個重要企業議題的聯結，更是近兩年來的新興議題。而本研究計畫也將會承接此一研究議題，由代理理論出發，探討現代企業組織中存在於股東、管理者與員工間的多層代理問題的關聯，是否會影響員工股票獎酬的財務績效效果。本研究認為用以因應股東與管理者之間代理問題之公司治理機制，會與因應管理者與員工間的代理問題之員工獎酬互相交互作用，進而對公司財務績效產生影響。因此本研究將討論三項公司治理機制（內部關係人、家族所有權、董事會規模），對員工股票獎酬與公司財務績效之間的干擾效果。This study will examine the linkage between employee equity incentives and corporate financial performance. We propose that employee equity incentives can enhance productivity for overtime; when the increased labor cost is expensed from the company’s earnings, the positive profitability effect may be so how eroded. However, the positive effects on productivity and reported profitability of employee equity incentives may still encourage investors in the short term, and create positive market reaction. In addition, following an emerging research stream about corporate governance and employee relations, this study also focuses on the relationships between corporate ownership structure and the utilization of employee ownership incentive schemes. This study proposes that the agency problems among shareholders, management, and employees will complicate the performance effects of employee equity incentives. Corporate governance mechanisms utilized by a firm will interact with employee equity incentives to influence corporate financial performance. This project will empirically examine the moderating effects of three important mechanisms of corporate governance (i.e. insider ownership, family ownership, board size) respectively. This study will employ a cross-section panel dataset to test our hypotheses. A longitudinal design of this study may allow us to clarify the causality between employee equity incentives and corporate financial performance. 研究期間 : 9808 ~ 9907
