| 摘要: | 台灣的過去十幾年來，國內高科技產業的迅速成長，分紅入股的採行常被視為產業的關鍵成功因素之一。學者與實務界多認為分紅入股政策，能夠讓員工感受到自己是企業體的一部分，藉以提高員工對組織之向心力，企圖激勵並留住優秀人才為公司效力。然而在國內多數產業普遍採行員工分紅入股，再加上我國股市的推波助瀾下，該制度卻成為員工考量就任與否的主要標準，亦成為企業間人才爭奪戰的重要籌碼。然而台灣式的分紅入股制度，與國外之員工分紅入股制度有根本上之差異，其主要在於國外之分紅入股制，多為長期激勵獎酬的設計，員工必須待離職或退休時才能由持股之信託要求現金之給付，而國內之制度卻可以讓員工在領取股票後，立即於市場中賣出換取現金，也因為如此，台灣的分紅入股制度並無法視為一長期性的激勵獎酬。然而這個台灣特有制度下的員工行為，現存的理論（如選擇權執行），雖能給予部分的解釋，但選擇權相關理論與此現象仍有本質上的基本差異，且其多僅由單純之風險態度一個概念詮釋個人行為，因此現存理論對台灣員工持有公司配發股票之傾向上，仍屬不足；而且台灣企業在運用分紅入股制度之時，也希望它能具有長期獎酬的特性。除了吸引員工外，也希望利用股票分紅以留住員工，也就是希望員工的行為與公司的長期績效產生關聯。所以雖然依照法律規範，員工有權立即賣出手中持股，但公司多會希望員工能較長期地持有公司。因此深入地去探討與瞭解員工對公司股票的持有意願，實是一個在理論上與實務上均十分有趣的議題。本研究將由現存之風險理論出發，探討員工對分紅入股制度與對持有公司配發股票的風險認知。根據相關理論，個人的風險偏好則會影響個人在不確定情境下對於可能損失情境的認知，而這會進一步影響到個人在此一情境下的採取風險行為的傾向。而其中個人風險偏好是一個穩定的個人特質，這又會與個人的其他差異（人口統計變項與人格特質），有所關聯；而風險情境的認知，除了受個人偏好的影響外，也會受到特定情境下不同資訊的影響。因此本研究嘗試串聯這些相關變數，由理論出發建立其間關聯，並指出在台灣分紅入股制度下的特定情境變數對員工風險認知的影響，以期對台灣企業員工在分紅入股制度下的對所配發股票的持有傾向有更深入的瞭解。本研究設計為調查研究。以個人為分析層次，同時以知識密集之科技產業員工為主要研究對象。預定爭取數家新竹科學園區內高科技公司的參與，對其旗下員工進行調查。希望能回數較具規模之樣本數，以期在分析之時，具有足夠之檢定力。 Taiwanese business grabbed the trend of employee financial programs; still, the idiosyncratic profit sharing and stock award systems are cultivated from the business and institution environments in Taiwan. Similar to deferred profit sharing in the U.S., the stock incentives in Taiwan are expected to link employees』 effort to organizational performance through distributing retained profits, in the form of a stock bonus, to employees. Yet, there exist large differences between ESOPs and Taiwan-style stock bonus plans, although the profits are distributed in the form of stocks on these types of two programs. In Taiwan, the stock profit sharing plans are not deferred compensation plans, since firms cannot restrict employees on the resale or transfer of the stock. It is common for employees to resell their stock awards on the market right away when they receive bonuses. Therefore, it is better to call Taiwanese stock profit sharing plans as stock bonus plans, since employees may cash their awarded stocks on the spot instead of keeping it to become owners. Taiwanese stock incentive scheme functions like a stock bonus program, so it is difficult to identify whether it still works as a long-term incentive scheme or as a cash bonus incentive. Do employees prefer stock bonus than other variable incentive schemes?? How long is the duration of incentive effects of the stock bonus when there is no resell restriction on employees? In order to understand the duration of stock incentives, we have to know employees attitudes toward the popular variable schemes respectively. We also have to explore to what extent employees want to hold their awarded stocks and remain their ownership status. This study draws from risk theories to depict employees』 propensity to holding bonus stocks. We argue that the timing of holding and selling the stocks may create uncertainty for employees. The decision about holding period becomes the most significant risk which Taiwanese stock bonus plans may cause for employees. Based on risk related theories, individuals vary widely in their risk behaviors (Harris and Raviv, 1979; Weber and Milliman, 1997; Williams and narendran, 1999). Individual risk behaviors are often inconsistent across decision contexts (Bromiley and Curely, 1992). It is not individuals』 risk preference alone to determine individuals』 risk choices. That is their risk preference in combination with situational factors to determine the person』s observable level of risk seeking or avoiding (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992). Thus, this study is going to build up a relationship framework among our variables of interests, including individual differences, situational factors, individual risk preference, individual』s risk perception about holding stocks, and individual』s propensity on holding (or selling) stocks. 研究期間：9308 ~ 9407 |
