近年來中國的發展與成長，已逐漸成為世界的焦點。本研究將2005年中國「股權分置改革」(split share structure reform)納入，探討所有權結構與負債水準之關係。本文以2002年至2008年間中國上市公司為樣本，利用Wald-test檢測：（1）股權分置改革前，國有企業 (State-owned enterprises)與民營企業負債水準是否有差異；（2）股權分置改革後，國有企業與民營企業負債水準是否有差異；（3）國有企業下，股權分置改革前與股權分置改革後負債水準是否有差異；（4）民營企業下，股權分置改革前與股權分置改革後負債水準是否有差異。本研究進一步利用PLS估計方法來探討造成其負債水準差異的原因。 實證結果發現：（1）股權分置改革前，國有企業相較於民營企業有較高的負債水準，說明在實施此改革前，國有企業較容易獲得國有銀行的資金挹注；（2）股權分置改革後，國有企業與民營企業在負債水準上已無差異，表示對民營企業來說，其獲得銀行資金的機會已逐漸提高，而原先僅有國有企業能獲得國有銀行資金的情形亦逐漸改善；（3）國有企業下，股權分置改革後之負債水準高於實施改革前，此改革雖導致國家所有權對負債的影響力下降，但法人所有權對負債之關係卻有正向的提升；（4）民營企業下，股權分置改革後之負債水準高於實施改革前，而此差異之原因為此改革使法人所有權對於負債水準的影響有上升的情形。綜合(3)(4)點，發現在股權分置改革後，機構投資人的重要性正在提升。 The development and growth in China has become the focus of the world in recent years. Due to the “Spilt Share Structure Reform” in 2005 in China, this paper examines the relations between ownership structure and financial leverage. The sample of this study contains Chinese listed companies between 2002 and 2008. Moreover, this study uses panel least squares analysis and Wald-test method to investigate (1) whether financial leverage is different between the SOEs (State-owned enterprises) and the EPFs (entrepreneurial private firms) before Spilt Share Structure Reform; (2) whether financial leverage is different between the SOEs and the EPFs after Spilt Share Structure Reform; (3) whether financial leverage differs before and after Spilt Share Structure Reform for the SOEs; (4) whether financial leverage differs before and after Spilt Share Structure Reform for the EPFs. The results are as follows. First, compared to the EPFs, the SOEs use more debt before the Spilt Share Structure Reform because, before this reform, the SOEs can get funds from the Chinese state-owned banks more easily. Second, there is no difference in financial leverage between the SOEs and the EPFs after the Spilt Share Structure Reform because the probability of getting funds from Chinese state-owned banks is increasing (decreasing) for EPFs (SOEs). Third, for the SOEs, the debt ratio is higher after the Spilt Share Structure Reform. While the influence of state ownership on debt ratio is reduced, the influence of legal ownership on debt ratio is increasing. Finally, for the EPFs, the debt ratio is higher after the Spilt Share Structure Reform because the influence of legal ownership on debt ratio is also increasing. Combining the third and the final results, we find that after the Spilt Share Structure Reform, the importance of the institutional investors is increasing.
