家族持股對CEO薪酬與創新關聯性的影響; The Effects of The Family Firm on the Association Between CEO Compensation and Innovation.

NCUIR > School of Management at National Central University > Graduate Institute of Business Administration > Electronic Thesis & Dissertation > Item 987654321/44091

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/44091

Title:	家族持股對CEO薪酬與創新關聯性的影響;The Effects of The Family Firm on the Association Between CEO Compensation and Innovation.
Authors:	魏町宇;TING-YU WEI
Contributors:	企業管理研究所
Keywords:	家族企業;CEO薪酬;創新;Innovation;CEO compensation;Family firm
Date:	2010-07-26
Issue Date:	2010-12-08 14:48:44 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	國立中央大學
Abstract:	本研究以2005至2008之台灣上市櫃公司之電子產業為樣本，經由實證結果，股權較集中的家族企業，因股東與經理人之間的衝突相對較小之下，為其自身利益與降低承擔之風險，故較有意願與誘因去蒐集RD相關資訊，使股東與經理人之間的資訊不對稱問題減緩。且家族企業亦會因長遠眼光與永續經營之觀點，鼓勵高階經理人從事創新活動，以維繫於產業中的地位與競爭優勢。於此，運用薪酬獎勵制度與創新牽引一起的做法，皆獲得顯著的證據支持家族較非家族企業有誘因與動機從事創新活動，以維持企業生存。 This research adapted listed electronic industries on Taiwan during 2005-2008 for an example to survey. Through empirical validations, applied salary reward constitution and creation migration approach could be reduced company risk and cooperation benefit, because there were less confliction between shareholder and manager. Therefore, it generated willing and incentive to collect RD related information, then reduced asymmetric information, which was between shareholder and manager. In a long term aspect, family-owned enterprise encouraged innovation activities to maintain the industrial status and competition advantage sustaining. Thus, there is significant evidence that there’s more incentive motivation in family than in non-family enterprise of innovation activities to support long term operation.
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute of Business Administration] Electronic Thesis & Dissertation

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