本文主要探討在不同所有權結構下，多角化與公司現金持有價值之間的關係，並依據股權分置改革前後、內部資本市場與代理理論，發展四個假說。研究樣本以中國大陸2003年至2009年間，上海證券交易所上市之企業為樣本，共3903個觀察值進行實證分析。實證結果發現，不論是國有企業或是境內法人企業，多角化均會降低現金持有價值，且現金價值皆小於一，支持多角化是由代理問題所驅動的論述；然而在股權分置改革後，不論所有權結構，多角化公司現金持有價值皆呈現顯著上升，顯示，股權分置改革，提升了公司運作的透明度與市場的監督力量，降低了代理問題，使得公司現金使用效率比股改前高。 This paper examines the relationship between diversification and the value of corporate cash holdings in different ownership structure and the impact of Split Share Structure Reform on this relationship. We develop four hypotheses based on internal capital market and agency problems. The sample contains the listed firms in Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2009 and we obtain 3903 firm-year observations. We find that diversification lower the value of cash. No matter firms are owned by state or legal person, the value of cash holdings is lower than 1. These findings support that diversification is driven by agency problems. After Split Share Structure Reform, the value of cash holdings is significant higher than before. This finding shows that Split Share Structure Reform lowers the negative impact of agency problems.
