過去的研究指出資訊不對稱問題易導致公司有較高融資成本而有較高的投資現金流量敏感度，因而影響到公司的投資或融資決策，使得公司投資易受到內部資金多寡的影響，因此高投資現金流量敏感度的公司是否愈願意透過自發性揭露來降低資訊不對稱的影響。本研究以2002至2009年國內上市櫃公司為研究對象，並以法人說明會作為自發性揭露的代理變數，探討投資現金流量敏感度與自發性揭露之間的關係，研究結果發現高投資現金流量敏感度的公司愈願意召開法人說明會且頻率愈大。 Prior research documents that information asymmetry increases the sensitivity of investment to internal funds and thus affects a firm’s investment or financing decisions. Therefore, firms with higher investment-cash flow sensitivity are more likely to voluntarily disclose in order to reduce information asymmetry and cost of capital. This study views conference calls as a voluntary disclosure mechanism and examines how investment-cash flow sensitivity influences the likelihood and frequency of conference calls. The results show that, due to higher information risk and financing cost, firms with higher investment-cash flow sensitivity are more likely to hold conference calls than those with lower investment-cash flow insensitivity firms.
